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A significant debate rages within corporate law scholarship as to whether
shareholders or managers should be granted authority over the tender offer process
once a bid is imminent. Both sides generally agree that the issue depends on
whether shareholders are capable of exercising informed choice over takeover bids.
Supporters of managerial veto power contend that the arguments favoring profes-
sional management of publicly held firms carry over into the tender offer context.
Proponents of shareholder choice, on the other hand, argue that shareholders can
act on their own behalf in the special circumstances surrounding contests for cor-
porate control.
This Article challenges the premise that the case for shareholder choice turns
principally on whether shareholders are capable of making informed choices. It
argues that adopting a strong shareholder choice regime may be value reducing
even if shareholders can effectively manage the firm post-bid. In particular, a
shareholder choice rule would give managers an incentive to search for alternative
defenses not practicably regulable by any legal regime--ones that may impose
greater costs on the firm than existing defenses. We demonstrate (a) that a num-
ber of such unregulable, value-reducing defenses exist, (b) that managerial threats
to use them are credible under plausible conditions, and (c) that their use would be
difficult or impossible for courts to regulate. Furthermore, we find empirical sup-
port for these hypotheses. Consequently, we conclude that an immutable, one-size-
fits-all shareholder choice rule is unlikely to improve shareholders' welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
In the years since the takeover wave of the 1980s, managers of
public corporations have developed increasingly successful strategies
for deterring or defeating unwanted tender offers. Although courts
initially viewed defensive strategies (such as poison pills, staggered
boards, and dual class stock capitalization) with suspicion, over time
they have embraced a significantly more deferential approach to anti-
takeover defenses. Indeed, under current law, managers of Delaware
corporations' face few impediments when erecting defenses that deter
unwanted acquisitions, provided that they are not selling control of
3the firm. All the while, shareholders generally have not attempted to
counter this jurisprudential trend by imposing ex ante limitations on
managers' control over tender offers.4
Nevertheless, many corporate law scholars view the extant regime
with a mixture of skepticism and alarm, arguing that it has exacer-
bated the agency cost problems endemic to publicly owned firms.
Directors and officers,5 they claim, systematically collaborate to em-
ploy antitakeover defenses that deter hostile acquisitions (which por-
tend managerial turnover), while simultaneously encouraging friendly
6bids (which confer substantial private benefits on incumbents).
Companies incorporated in Delaware accounted for nearly three-fifths of the
Fortune 500 publicly listed companies in 2002. See Del. Div. of Corps., Why Choose
Delaware As Your Corporate Home?, Homepage, at http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.
shtml (last updated Nov. 3, 2003) (reporting that "more than 50% of all U.S. publicly
traded companies and 58% of the Fortune 500" have chosen Delaware as their legal
home).
, These categorical strategies often are dubbed 'Just say no" defenses. See Para-
mount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1990) ("The
adoption of structural safety devices alone does not trigger Revlon."); see also Unitrin,
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (concluding that, if defensive
measures, "individually and collectively ... were proportionate to the threat" received
from the hostile acquirer, then the board's adoption of the measures "is entitled to
review under the traditional business judgment rule").
' By contrast, managers generally are prohibited from playing favorites among
bidders once a control change of the company has become inevitable. See, e.g., Para-
mount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994)
("[T]he directors must decide which alternative is most likely to offer the best value
reasonably available to the stockholders."); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) ("[W]hen bidders make relatively similar of-
fers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill
their.., duties by playing favorites with the contending factions.").
See infra Part VI.A (discussing the empirical data on shareholders' attitudes to-
ward managerial choice).
' In what follows, we shall refer to directors and officers collectively as "managers."
6 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
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Managerial freedom to adopt defenses thereby hurts nonmanagerial
shareholders, both by removing the disciplinary effect of potential
hostile offers and by enabling managers to appropriate private gains
from acquisitions that rightfully belong to all shareholders.
Accordingly, skeptics of managerial discretion argue that share-
holders should have ultimate authority to choose among tender of-
fers, on the grounds that, all things considered, shareholders' judg-
ment in such contexts is ultimately more reliable than that of
professional (but irremediably conflicted) managers. s Although the
universe of "shareholder choice" proposals is relatively varied, all
share at least a few common, prescriptive features: most notably, they
propose that shareholders should have authority over managers'
defensive actions when shareholders have sufficient incentives and
capacity to choose between the managers' preferred action and the
hostile bid. The most aggressive shareholder choice proposals assume
that, post-bid, shareholders have sufficient incentives and capacity to
evaluate any business decision affecting takeovers, and thus conclude
that shareholders should be granted authority to overturn managers'
takeover defenses when either a bid has already emerged or when the
firm adopts a policy whose sole purpose is to grant managers control
over hostile tender offers. 9
At the same time, most serious shareholder choice proponents
stop short of extending their argument to all decisions that are cur-
rently undertaken by managers. Rather, they accept the foundational
precept (reflected in the "business judgment rule") that publicly held
firms maximize value when managers control ordinary business deci-
sions since shareholders have little incentive or ability to obtain the
information necessary to make such routine, day-to-day decisions.'0
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887,
928 (2002) (finding empirical support for the strength of poison pills used in combi-
nation with "effective staggered boards" as an antitakeover defense).
7 See infra Part I.B (discussing the views of leading proponents of shareholder
choice).
8 See infra Part I.B (presenting the view of some scholars that, in the information-
rich context of a takeover bid, shareholders are better decision makers than managers
who are defending the status quo).
9 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69
U. CHi. L. REv. 973, 1027-28 (2002) (arguing that shareholders should be permitted to
vote on whether to pursue a tender offer, even in the face of an alternative plan by the
board that keeps the firm free-standing).
L0 E.g., id. at 996 (asserting that letting shareholders of a publicly traded company
make ordinary business decisions is "not a viable option"). Indeed, even when an
ordinary decision entails a conflict of interest, scholars generally prefer to vest
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Consequently, much of the debate over shareholder choice is
thought to turn on whether, all things considered, shareholders can
be expected to exercise informed choice within the specific nexus of
activity related to tender offers. Underlying this fundamentally em-
pirical question, however, is a deeper logical proposition: that the
demonstrated decision-making capacity of shareholders is both a nec-
essary and sufficient condition to establish the superiority of share-
holder choice relative to the status quo of managerial control."
This Article refutes that proposition. In particular, we show that
even when shareholders can effectively assess and react to hostile bids,
shareholder choice may not be the optimal legal policy. Indeed, al-
lowing informed shareholders to exercise control over tender offers
may, ironically, make shareholders worse off than they would be un-
der the status quo, where self-interested managers effectively choose
among takeover options.
Our argument hinges on recognizing that a shareholder choice
regime may significantly affect how managers govern the firm ex ante.
While shareholder choice limits the defenses available to managers, it
does not reduce managers' desire to deter hostile bids. If anything,
an effective shareholder choice regime enhances managerial incen-
tives to deter acquisitions by suppressing hostile offers. 2  Conse-
quently, under shareholder choice, managers have an incentive to
search for effective defenses that are not plausibly susceptible to legal
regulation of any stripe. In the extreme, managers may be willing to
decision-making authority in outside directors. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 104 (1991) ("Dis-
interested directors ... are proxies for investors and can be cheap substitutes for liabil-
ity rules in assuring contractual performance."). By contrast, in the case of tender of-
fers, many corporate law scholars advocate shareholder authority even when the firm
has a majority of outside directors. See infra Part I.B (discussing leading shareholder
choice proposals, none of which predicate the proposed scope of shareholder author-
ity on the composition of the board).
" See infra Parts I.A-B (discussing the debate over shareholder choice).
12 In this Article, we focus on the strongest shareholder choice regimes that grant
shareholders ultimate authority to determine the fate of all pure and post-bid defenses.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 976 (arguing that "once a mechanism that ensures
an undistorted choice by shareholders is in place, the board should not be able to veto
an acquisition beyond the period necessary for preparing alternatives for sareholder
consideration"). For a discussion of intermediate regimes, see infra Part V.
" For a discussion of other arguments favoring managerial choice beyond those
offered here, see, for example, Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Corporate Constitutional-
ism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 463, 484-88
(2003) (arguing that shareholders may benefit from granting boards control over
tender offers because boards are better able to implement a selling strategy); Lynn A.
Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public
2003]
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employ value-reducing defenses that they would not utilize under a
regime where they had substantially more control over which tender
offers are allowed to go forward.
Under even the broadest shareholder choice proposal, managers
would have available to them a wide range of unregulated and un-
regulable defenses. Existing shareholder choice proposals do not
regulate all possible defenses. They generally limit the domain of
shareholder choice to managerial actions that are targeted at, or
occur during, hostile tender offers; they do not seek to regulate all
ordinary business transactions that might deter tender offers, given
shareholders' accepted inability to regulate such transactions. Thus, a
substantial zone of business action would likely remain unregulated,
even by the strongest shareholder choice regime.
Managers precluded by shareholder choice from pursuing cur-
rently popular defenses can utilize this unregulated zone to deter ac-
quisitions, "embedding" defenses within a host of seemingly ordinary,
and otherwise legitimate, pre-bid business transactions. 1 Because
these arrangements largely mimic transactions that are frequently
value enhancing, they would almost certainly be beyond the purview
of a shareholder choice regime, enabling managers to escape effective
oversight of such defenses even when they reduce firm value.
A notable example of such an embedded defense is the inclusion
of a "change of control" provision in an everyday business contract
(such as a lease,joint venture, license, employment agreement or debt
instrument) that imposes costs on the firm in the event of a change of
control. 6 Many companies use these provisions at present to enhance
Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 686-87 (2003) (suggesting
that giving ultimate control over the corporation's assets to the board may promote
team production). See also Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes,
73 VA. L. REv. 111, 171-76 (1987) (finding that certain antitakeover provisions may
benefit small shareholders).
14 See infra Parts I.D & II.C.2 (explaining why these defenses would be so difficult
to regulate).
1 In arguing that managers may adopt pre-bid embedded defenses, we do not
claim that managers currently employ these measures regularly for defensive purposes.
To the contrary, we contend that managers currently employ embedded measures
primarily for legitimate reasons and entrench themselves using lower cost pure de-
fenses, such as poison pills. Infra Part II. Thus, we view the potential substitution into
embedded defenses as a cost of shareholder choice because managers have no need to
resort to value-reducing embedded defenses under current law that enables them to
deter hostile bids through more targeted means. If courts adopted proposals to give
shareholders a greater voice over defensive measures, however, managers would have a
strong incentive to adjust their own behavior toward such embedded defenses.
'6 See infra Part II (discussing the availability of pre-bid embedded defenses).
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firm value by reducing the costs of contracting with a third party, al-
beit at the cost of deterring some acquisitions. Under shareholder
choice, however, managers could employ similar measures to deter
acquisitions in situations where firm value is reduced. Such provisions
are likely not regulable because shareholders and courts cannot relia-
bly distinguish change of control provisions that are value enhancing
when implemented from those that are value reducing when imple-
mented.1
7
Accordingly, even when shareholders can directly regulate tender
offers themselves, shareholder choice may reduce shareholders' wel-
fare if it encourages managers to employ unregulable substitute
defenses that reduce firm value, not only by deterring takeovers
(friendly or hostile), but also by inefficiently altering the operating
profile of the firm outside of the takeover context. 1
There are a number of reasons to believe that embedded defenses
(such as those described above) pose a sufficient threat to warrant
caution before adopting any shareholder choice regime. First, as
proponents of shareholder choice agree, courts and shareholders are
See infra Part tI.C.2 (discussing courts' inability to regulate such defenses).
" While others have noted the possibility of defense substitution, they have not
examined either the breadth of available substitutes or whether managers can credibly
threaten to adopt these substitutes even if doing so could decrease the probability of
friendly deals. E.g., Jennifer Arlen, Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses:
Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
917, 920, 928 (2002) (arguing that shareholder choice may not be optimal because
shareholders may legitimately be reluctant to limit board power to impose existing de-
fensive measures for fear that the board may respond with more destructive measures);
see infra note 65 (discussing other articles addressing the possibility of defense substitu-
tion).
By contrast, the European debate over takeover law has been dominated by con-
cern that extensive regulation of pure and post-bid defenses will simply induce manag-
ers to employ pre-bid defenses (otherwise known as preventive measures) as substi-
tutes. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable
Should EU Corporations Be? in COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE (Eddy Wy-
meersch & Guido Ferrarini eds., Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at
6-8, 12, on file with authors) (observing that the European Commission's proposed
"break through" rule governing takeovers could have the adverse effect of inducing
managers to substitute into alternative, value-reducing defenses); Paul Davies & Klaus
Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (forthcoming 2004) (on file with authors) (observing that
managers can undermine existing European Union proposals to regulate post-bid de-
fenses by implementing defenses before an offer materializes and noting that requir-
ing pre-bid, shareholder approval of such defenses would be "too great an interference
with the operation of centralized management"). Unlike this Article, these studies do
not fully analyze the welfare implications of defense substitution resulting from share-
holder choice.
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poorly positioned to regulate day-to-day managerial decisions made
outside of the context of a tender offer, particularly those that poten-
tially have legitimate business justifications. 9 Thus, managers inevita-
bly have available to them defenses that are unregulable.
Second, adoption of a shareholder choice regime would give
managers a strong incentive to employ (indeed, even to invent) un-
regulable embedded defenses, even at the expense of firm value. 20
Indeed, the strongest shareholder choice regimes may provide the
greatest incentives for managers to adopt value-reducing substitute
defenses. For example, should courts seek to regulate all defenses
targeted at hostile deals, managers could instead employ pre-bid em-
bedded "blanket" defenses, which circumvent hostile and friendly
deals alike. Blanket defenses are particularly difficult to regulate be-
cause they are the most likely to serve nondefensive legitimate busi-
ness purposes for some firms.2 1 These defenses also impose the great-
est cost on the firm, since they deter all forms of acquisition.
Managers subject to such a strong shareholder choice regime
might be willing to adopt blanket defenses, even when they would not
do so under a managerial choice regime, because the shareholder
choice rule itself reduces the costs that managers bear in deterring
19 See infra Part I.D.1, II.C.2 (discussing the inability of courts and shareholders to
regulate pre-bid embedded defenses); see, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738-39
(Del. 1960) ("We are precluded from substituting our uninformed opinion for that of
experienced business managers of a corporation who have no personal interest in the
outcome, and whose sole interest is the furtherance of the corporate enterprise.");
EASTERBROOK & FIscHEL, supra note 10, at 94 (identifying as rationales for the business
judgment rule the notions that 'judges lack competence in making business deci-
sions," that a "fear of personal liability" will reduce managerial risk taking and deter
talented people from serving as directors, and that "liability rules have only limited
usefulness as a governance mechanism in the publicly-held corporation").
_0 Indeed, the history of mergers and acquisitions case law is largely defined by
managers inventing and employing substitute defenses in response to efforts to regu-
late previously employed defenses. For example, the poison pill arose in response to
efforts to regulate selective self-tenders. WILLIAM KLEIN, ET. AL, BUSINESS AssocIA-
TIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS 784-85
(5th ed. 2003). As described by the court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), the managers of Revlon also employed an alterna-
tive substitute defense, in the form of debt-containing covenants designed to impede
an acquisition, which were redeemable at the discretion of Revlon's board. Id. at 177
(describing these notes). Similarly, the managers of Time, Inc. responded to impedi-
ments to selective sales imposed by the Delaware court's opinion in Revlon, 506 A.2d at
184, through the defensive use of an acquisition by Time of Warner. Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149 (1990).
21 See infta Part II.C.2 (discussing the difficulty courts would face in regulating
blanket penalty change of control provisions).
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ostensibly friendly deals.22 Under a strong shareholder choice regime,
bidders would concentrate on gaining shareholders' favor by maxi-
mizing share price at the expense of managers' private gains from the
deal. Thus, managers would perceive most (if not all) acquisitions to
be hostile, offering managers little in the way of private benefits. Con-
sequently, the cost of deterring any truly friendly deals would be
minimal, while the benefit of deterring hostile bids would be signifi-
cant. Thus, rather than enhancing shareholder welfare, a strong
shareholder choice regime might prove counterproductive by induc-
ing managers to adopt measures that reduce the expected number of
acquisitions (both friendly and hostile).
Third, shareholder choice proponents cannot rely on market
forces (e.g., the market for managers) or the threat of a proxy contest
to dissuade managers from employing such substitute defenses. The
argument for shareholder choice itself is premised on the presump-
tion that neither market forces nor the threat of proxy contests
adequately deters managers from employing existing defenses to re-
duce firm value. There is no reason to expect that market forces and
proxies would offer any greater impediment to managers' use of pre-
bid embedded defenses. Indeed, such defenses would be even more
difficult for markets and shareholder proxy contests to expose
because managers adopting embedded measures have a more credi-
ble claim to be acting to maximize firm value.
Accordingly, even if shareholders had the incentive and the capac-
ity to regulate tender offers, we conclude that shareholder choice may
not increase shareholder welfare relative to the status quo ante.
Although a strong shareholder choice regime may increase share-
holder welfare for those takeovers that do occur,23 it would simultane-
ously give managers an incentive to retrench using substitute defenses
that both (a) destroy value directly and (b) reduce the expected
number of bids that ever reach shareholders. We are skeptical, there-
fore, that an immutable, one-size-fits-all rule is appropriate in such
heterogeneous contexts. Rather, courts may wish to give increased
deference to the choices shareholders themselves have made to grant
2 Cf Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limi-
tations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775, 887-90 (1982) (arguing that the
risk of substitution from post-bid defenses to pre-bid defenses is not particularly sig-
nificant because managers will eschew blanket pre-bid defenses as these are too costly
to managers).
23 The effect of shareholder choice on shareholder welfare for those takeovers
that do occur depends on the effect of shareholder choice on managers' compensa-
tion. Infra Parts II.D, IV.D and text accompanying notes 134-35.
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managers power over takeovers, whenever such choices appear to be
clear.24
In addition to the principal contribution described above, our
analysis may shed light on a number of empirical quandaries within
corporate scholarship. In particular, our analysis may provide an al-
ternative explanation for shareholders' apparent acceptance of mana-
gerial choice. For example, recent studies have found that sharehold-
ers purchasing shares in initial public offerings (IPOs) do not appear
to impose a penalty on firms that include antitakeover protections in
their initial charters; indeed, firms regularly go public with such de-
fenses. 5 While some have interpreted these findings as evidence of
either irrationality or inertia among capital market participants,26 our
analysis suggests another interpretation: antitakeover protections do
not induce a capital market discount because they reduce the risk of
managers employing higher-cost substitute defenses. Additionally,
our findings may help shed light on studies that find incentive com-
pensation for executives to be negatively related to takeover impedi-
27ments.
Before commencing with our argument, a few initial observations
are warranted. First, although our analysis assumes that shareholder
choice cannot extend to routine business decisions, our conclusions
do not depend on the particular domain of shareholder choice. Our
analysis holds for any shareholder choice rule, so long as there exists a
zone of business actions in which managers can embed defensive ac-
tions that courts and shareholders cannot effectively regulate.
24 Thus, we are more cautious than others about whether courts can confidently
invalidate antitakeover provisions to which shareholders consented (either at the IPO
stage or through a shareholder vote). See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 22, at 822 (suggesting
that courts invalidate certain pre-bid pure defenses notwithstanding shareholder ap-
proval). For a different argument favoring respect of shareholders' ex ante decisions
to grant managers authority over takeovers, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 13, at 484-89.
25 See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 85-86 (2001) (finding that anti-
takeover provisions are common at the IPO stage and that about half the IPO firms
studied adopted the strongest antitakeover protections).
26 See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitake-
over Protection at the 1PO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 20 (2003) (discussing explanations for
why IPO firms include antitakeover protections).
27 See infra Part VI.B (providing empirical evidence); see also Keith D. Harvey &
Ronald E. Shrieves, Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Governance Choices, 24
J. FIN. RES. 495, 505 (2001) (finding that the relative absence of outside directors is
negatively related to high-powered incentive compensation).
28 Substitution presents a problem for many legal regimes. In the case of the
mildest regimes, substitution may render the regime irrelevant if managers can easily
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Second, our argument is also robust to the possible responses that
shareholders might employ to deal with value-reducing substitute
defenses. In particular, our formal analysis incorporates the possibil-
ity that shareholders might attempt to deter managers from using sub-
stitute defenses by using incentive compensation schemes that tie
managers' welfare more closely to the value of the firm. We show that
such shareholder responses would not fully cure the problems
presented by shareholder choice. Given the gains to managers of de-
terring hostile deals, shareholders may be unable, or unwilling,
to make sufficient incentive payments to induce the efficient deci-
sions.29 Further, even when it is possible to offer managers appropri-
ate incentive compensation to deter such defenses, we show that the
amounts awarded may need to be so large that shareholders would be
better off under a regime that simply granted managers the power to
deter hostile bids:
Finally, although our analysis focuses on a comparison of a strong
shareholder choice regime with a strong managerial choice rule, we
also examine more intermediate shareholder choice regimes. We
find that intermediate regimes that adopt a categorical approach to
defense regulation are similarly subject to problems of managerial
substitution. By contrast, the problems of managerial substitution
may be muted by a "fuzzy" regime that grants managers some latitude
to favor friendly bidders over hostile ones, while raising the specter of
court regulation without precisely delineating a zone in which courts
will intervene.3'
employ substitute defenses targeted at hostile deals. Efforts to expand the regulatory
domain can lead to substitution into increasingly value-reducing measures. See, e.g.,
Stephen J. Choi & Eric L. Talley, Playing Favorites with Shareholders, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
271, 311-13 (2002) (noting a similar substitution effect in attempts to prohibit "favorit-
ism" toward block shareholders).
29 Indeed, most arguments for shareholder choice are predicated on the idea that
executive incentive compensation does not adequately solve agency cost problems. See
infta Part I.B (presenting arguments for shareholder choice). But see Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Wonying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to
Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 896-97 (2002) (arguing that managerial choice is
less costly than many assert because shareholders have employed adaptive mechanisms,
such as executive incentive compensation, to mute the agency costs associated with
managerial choice).
30 See infra Part IV.D (showing that shareholders cannot erase the negative effects
of shareholder choice through offering managers incentive contracts).
s1 Infra Part V.B (discussing the potential benefits of a "fuzzy" intermediate re-
gime). This Article does not determine the optimal scope of a shareholder choice
rule. Rather, its central contribution is to introduce an additional consideration that
must be taken into account in the design of one.
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines
the existing debate over shareholder choice and determines its limits
and proper domain. In so doing, it identifies a previously unexam-
ined zone of unregulable pre-bid embedded defenses. Part II estab-
lishes the existence of a wide variety of existing pre-bid embedded
defenses that managers could employ to deter bids, free from effective
court oversight. Part III examines whether managers would respond
to shareholder choice by adopting value-reducing pre-bid embedded
defenses they would not otherwise adopt. Part IV presents a more
formal analysis of shareholder choice. Part V discusses the benefits of
employing an intermediate regime. Finally, Part VI provides empiri-
cal support consistent with our findings.
I. THE DOMAIN OF SHAREHOLDER CHOICE
This Part examines the debate over shareholder choice proposals.
While the various incarnations of shareholder choice proposals are far
from homogeneous, they share a few guiding principles that limit the
domain of shareholder authority over takeover decisions. Thus, even
the most expansive shareholder choice proposals do not seek to regu-
late all defensive measures that managers might employ. Yet the exis-
tence of unregulable defenses does more than delineate the outer
bounds of shareholder choice; it also alters the relative merits of
shareholder choice versus managerial control. We show that the gains
from limiting managerial authority over regulable defenses depends
on whether managers can respond by employing alternative, unregu-
lable defenses that impose greater costs on the firm.
A. Advantages of Managerial Control of Publicly Held Firms
The separation of ownership and control is a defining characteris-
tic of publicly held firms. Dispersed shareholders seek to maximize
their gains from investing by contributing capital to publicly held
firms managed by professional managers, who have considerable
expertise but little personal stake in the firm. Shareholders of pub-
licly held firms relinquish any right to exercise day-to-day control over
the management of the firm. They give up this control in the expec-
tation that firm value is maximized under the control of professional
managers, notwithstanding the recognition that managers sometimes
will be tempted to serve their own interests at the expense of share-
holders.
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There are a number of reasons that professional managers are
thought to have a comparative advantage over shareholders in govern-
ing public companies. In addition to being specifically trained for the
task and better informed about the firm, managers can make in-
formed decisions free from the costly collective action problems that
32plague decentralized governance . Even sophisticated shareholders
generally are not sufficiently informed to manage the firms they own
because they own a relatively modest fraction of any one company and
thus have neither the incentives to acquire nor the capacity to analyze
the information needed to make prudent, everyday business deci-
sions3 1 Moreover, professional management of everyday business is
superior even if the board could readily provide shareholders with suf-
ficient information because shareholders must exercise their judg-
ment through voting--a process plagued by a host of coordination
and collective action problems.34
This presumption favoring managerial control over the daily op-
erations of publicly held firms-free from shareholder interference-
is expressed both in the considerable power over business operations
granted to directors by Delaware General Corporation Law section
141 (a)3" and in the accompanying restrictions placed by the business
32 Indeed, the very reason publicly held corporations exist is to exploit the advan-
tages of vesting control of the firm in professional managers who do not own the firm.
See, e.g., CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 158 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the corporate form and its ad-
vantages).
33 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS 159 (8th ed. 2000) ("[l]f a shareholder owns only a tiny amount of a corpora-
tion's stock, it is not cost-effective for her to spend a significant amount of time on the
corporation's affairs. Such a shareholder, therefore, will be 'rationally apathetic.'"); see
also O'KELLEY& THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 158 ("A rational person in the shoes of a
typical small stakes shareholder would not be inclined to bear the costs required to be-
come fully informed about corporate affairs or to communicate with, and coordinate
the actions of, other shareholders.").
34 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 66 ("Indeed, the collective choice
problems that attend voting in corporations with large numbers of contracting parties
suggest that voting rarely serves any function except in extremis."); see also RonaldJ. Gil-
son & Alan Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corporate Control, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 783 (2001) (describing the problems with requiring a
shareholder vote on takeover proposals). These are but a subset of arguments favoring
managerial power. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production The-
oy of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 299-305 (1999) (justifying the business judg-
ment rule as a mechanism for insulating boards of directors so that they might fairly
arbitrate interconstituency disputes).
s5 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors.")
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judgment rule on shareholders seeking to challenge board decisions.
The rule constrains shareholders' authority to challenge management
decisions by the board of directors and applies to both legal and equi-
table actions challenging a business decision by the board. The rule
effectively insulates board actions from shareholder challenge unless
the shareholder can show that the board was tainted by self-interest,
was uninformed, or did not act in the good faith rational belief that its
36actions were in the best interests of the firm. Although the protec-
tion afforded by the business judgment rule obviously increases man-
agers' ability to act in their own interests, the prevailing wisdom is
that, in the course of ordinary business transactions, these costs of
managerial authority are outweighed decidedly by the benefits of
permitting professional managers to govern the firm, free from
shareholder interference.3 7
B. The Case for Shareholder Control over Tender Offers
Proponents of maintaining managerial control over tender offers
argue that the same considerations justifying the business judgment
rule also apply to takeovers. Shareholders are not sufficiently well in-
formed about the future value of the firm to evaluate a takeover bid,
they argue, and do not have the requisite incentives to obtain the nec-
essary information. In addition, even if shareholders were adequately
informed, they would lack the capacity and business acumen to evalu-
ate a bid properly. Consequently, managerial choice proponents con-
tend, shareholders are far better off vesting authority over tender of-
fers in the hands of expert managers (just as they do with other
38business decisions).
See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-25, 136 (1986) (stating that the
business judgment rule prevents shareholders from challenging managers' decisions
that arguably are clear mistakes, unless the shareholders can show self-interest, lack of
due care, or waste).
37 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 93-102 (arguing that share-
holder litigation challenging board decision making is not a good method for deter-
ring poor business decisions).
38 See Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037, 1064
(2002) (arguing that it is important to "preserve the board's role as the best negotiator
on behalf of the shareholders" because "mergers, acquisitions, takeovers and proxy
fights and the legal rules applicable to them are complex"); Martin Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 103-04 (1979) ("Takeover bids are not
so different from other major business decisions as to warrant a unique sterilization of
the directors in favor of direct action by the shareholders."). Some scholars discuss
and criticize the "hidden value" argument for managerial authority. See Bernard Black
& Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value,
[Vol. 152: 577
PERILS OF SHAREHOLDER CHOICE
By contrast, shareholder choice proponents generally agree that
managers should exercise control over ordinary business decisions, 9
but argue that managers should not control the fate of tender offers.0
Shareholders do not benefit from professional management post-
tender offers, shareholder choice proponents contend, because
managers' judgment at that juncture is infected by self-interest. Be-
cause hostile acquisitions frequently presage managerial turnover,4'
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521, 521 (2002) (describing the hidden value justification for mana-
gerial choice, under which a firm's true economic value is visible to well-informed cor-
porate directors, but not to the company's shareholders); Kahan & Rock, supra note
13, at 481-83 (discussing the view of "Hamiltonian" corporate scholars who assert that
managerial decision making is better because managers have private information
about future value that cannot optimally or effectively be shared with shareholders).
Some scholars present other arguments that do not depend on managers' superior
decision-making capacity. See sources cited supra note 13.
" See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON
THE LAw OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 252-53 (2003) (presenting arguments in favor of
the business judgment rule); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 93 (defending
the business judgment rule).
Even the strongest proponents of shareholder choice typically stop short of advo-
cating shareholder scrutiny over decisions about day-to-day management of the firm.
For example, Lucian Bebchuk, who probably takes the most expansive view among
prominent theorists of shareholder choice, nevertheless accepts the importance of
professional managerial control over general business operations (as opposed to char-
ter amendments and mergers). See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 996 (supporting
managerial authority over investment decisions made in the ordinary course of busi-
ness); LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK, THE CASE FOR EMPOWERING SHAREHOIDERS 16 (Berke-
ley Olin Program in Law & Econ., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper Series No.
86, 2003) ("Dispersed public shareholders would be better off remaining largely pas-
sive and having the company run by management.... [T]he suggestion is to supple-
ment centralized management with a power to intervene that can be expected to be
used, at most, occasionally and to remain in the background most of the time."), avail-
able at http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art86.
40 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 988-1028 (2002) (arguing for shareholder
control over the fate of hostile offers); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tfender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1034-38 (1982) (arguing for an auction-
eering rule that allows managers to solicit bids but requires managers to submit bids to
shareholders); Black & Kraakman, supra note 38, at 559-63 (arguing that managers
should be allowed to 'just say no" to a bid subject to a shareholder veto at the next
meeting, but should not be permitted to maintain a defense that allows it to 'just say
never"); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1194-1204 (1981) (arguing
that managers should be completely passive in the face of a bid); Ronald J. Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REV. 819, 848-65 (1981) (arguing for shareholder authority over tender of-
fers).
41 See Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate Take-
overs, and Management Turnover, 46J. FIN. 671, 677 (1991) ("The dramatic increase in
the turnover rate of top managers following takeovers.., indicates that takeovers are
an important device for altering the top management of target firms .... ).
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managers have strong self-preservation motives to resist hostile deals
altogether and favor those friendly acquisitions that provide either
continued job security or an attractive managerial buyout (at share-
holders' expense) .42 Not only can these self-serving incentives reduce
shareholder welfare at the point of a tender offer, they also can re-
duce firm value ex ante by muting the disciplinary effect of the market
for corporate control.43
In addition, champions of shareholder choice contend, share-
holders have a capacity to act in the context of a tender offer that they
lack in the cool climate of ordinary business transactions. Tender of-
fers are relatively rare, well-publicized occurrences in the life of a firm
and tend to attract significant attention among the owners of a target
firm. While shareholders ordinarily choose (rationally) to remain ig-
norant, the stakes involved in tender offers are sufficiently large to
provide shareholders with the requisite incentive to become in-
formed. Moreover, shareholders of tender offer targets may be more
sophisticated than average because arbitrageurs and other sophisti-
cated investors tend to buy likely targets. Accordingly, as managers
cannot be trusted to act in the best interests of the shareholders, and
shareholders can act on their own behalf post-tender offer, share-
holder choice advocates argue that shareholders should be granted
control over corporate decisions regarding tender offers.44
While shareholder choice proponents agree that boards should
not have unfettered discretion at the point of a tender offer, they dis-
agree about the exact circumstances under which shareholders should
be able to override management's wishes and accept a proposed ten-
der. These differences should not be surprising since, in the end,
42 See, e.g., James F. Cotter & Marc Zenner, How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender
Offer Process, 35J. FIN. ECON. 63, 88-94 (1994) (offering empirical support for the claim
that managerial resistance to tender offers appears to be driven by managers' self-
interest, rather than shareholders' interests); Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long,
Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15 RANDJ. ECON. 54, 67
(1984) (providing evidence of the connection between managerial success and take-
over bid resistance).
'S See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 994 (arguing that board veto may lead to "mana-
gerial slack").
" See id. at 991-94 (arguing that shareholders are better able to regulate tender
offers than managers who are infected with self-interest); Black & Kraakman, supra
note 38, at 524-25 (critiquing the hidden value model and arguing that a shareholder-
centered approach to takeover regulation is preferable); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 40, at 1199-1201 (proposing that managers should play a more passive role re-
garding tender offers); Gilson, supra note 40, at 845-48 (proposing that mangers
should not be able to prevent hostile offers).
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shareholder choice constitutes an exception to the general rule favor-
ing professional management. " Proponents of shareholder choice
express varying views about those circumstances where shareholders
have the incentives to obtain, and the capability to act upon, the in-
formation necessary to override managerial resistance to a hostile
tender offer because different takeover defenses place heterogeneous
burdens on shareholders' decision-making capacity. Thus, the varia-
tion among shareholder choice proposals generally reflects disagree-
ments about which defensive measures shareholders practically are
capable of evaluating and invalidating. Understanding this heteroge-
neity has important implications not just for the domain of share-
holder choice, however, but also for the potential validity of all share-
holder choice proposals.
C. Taxonomy of Defensive Measures
Shareholder choice proponents generally agree that the outer
limits of shareholder choice depends upon shareholders' ability to ob-
tain and analyze the information necessary to exercise an informed
choice about the relative merits of a tender offer, as compared to any
actions managers have taken to deter the hostile offer.46 Thus, even
the most ardent choice proponents agree that shareholder choice
should be limited to those situations where shareholders have suffi-
cient incentives to obtain, and capacity to analyze and act on, the
information necessary to evaluate the merits of the defensive measure
in question.
To understand the practical constraints on shareholders' ability to
evaluate managers' defensive actions, it is useful to distinguish take-
over defenses based on two criteria: (1) whether the defense is adopted
'5 See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 995-96 (asserting that shareholders should be
granted authority over takeovers even though it would not be viable to grant them au-
thority over ordinary business decisions).
'6 As shareholder choice proponents recognize, ensuring that shareholders are
sufficiently informed to evaluate whether to override a managerial defense is a neces-
sary, but not sufficient, condition for vesting them with control. In addition, share-
holders must be able to act collectively in their best interests. For a discussion of
whether voting or a tender offer best facilitates shareholder decision making, compare
Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 34, at 790-92, which argues that a straight tender offer is
preferable to requiring a shareholder vote on takeover proposals, with LUCIAN ARYE
BEBCHUK & OLIVER HART, TAKEOVER BIDS VS. PROxy FIGHTS IN CONTESTS FOR CORPO-
RATE CONTROL 5 Uohn M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harv. Law Sch., Discussion
Paper No. 336, 2001), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin
center, which argues that shareholder voting on acquisitions is preferable to decision
making through the tender offer process.
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in the shadow of a hostile bid or is adopted in the ordinary course of
business (well before a takeover bid seems likely) and (2) whether the
defense is a pure defense solely tailored to deter hostile offers or is
embedded in an ordinary business transaction that conceivably could
be in the firm's best interests notwithstanding its effect on potential
tender offers. These two distinctions, in turn, motivate a simple tax-
onomy of defenses through a two-by-two matrix, pictured in Table 1
below. In the matrix, the timing dimension of the defense is repre-
sented on the horizontal axis while the tailoring dimension is on the
vertical axis:
Table 1. A Simple Taxonomy of Defenses
Ordinary
Business Post-Bid
Defnsie Poison Pill.Pio il DefensiveDefensive Poison Pills; Redemptions; Blank Check
Purpose Classified/Staggered Preferred with hostile-only
oar triggers
Embedded
Defense 6 Spin Offs; Defensive
Acquisitions White Knights
As the matrix reflects, the intuitive claim for shareholder capacity
to make informed business decisions is stronger in the case of post-bid
defenses than for pre-bid defenses and is stronger for pure defenses
than embedded defenses. Accordingly, the focus of shareholder choice
proposals has been on granting shareholders authority over defenses
falling in the right column and the top row of the matrix (i.e., the
NW, NE, and SE quadrants). We consider each dimension in turn.
1. Pre- Versus Post-Bid Defenses
Consider first the distinction between defenses implemented be-
fore a bid is imminent (i.e., in the ordinary course of business) and
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those implemented post-bid (or once a takeover is imminent).
Shareholders are generally presumed to be better able to determine
whether to override a post-bid defensive measure than a pre-bid
measure because shareholders are better informed and have a greater
incentive to act in the heat and light generated by a tender offer. As
previously discussed, a takeover bid rarely occurs in the life of a firm
and has enormous potential consequences for shareholders when it
does. These high stakes provide shareholders with significant incen-
tives to become informed. Moreover, the costs to shareholders of ob-
taining information are likely to be lower post-bid than in the course
of ordinary business transactions since a tender offer not only signals
one bidder's outside evaluation of firm value, but it also results in in-
tense scrutiny by other potential buyers, investors, research analysts,
47and the press.
The post-bid environment also diminishes the collective action
problems that normally attend shareholder governance. Shareholders
are better able to act post-bid because target firms often end up with a
proportionately greater number of informed investors, such as arbi-
trageurs, investment banks, and institutional investors. Thus, even if
shareholders are generally ill-positioned to make business decisions in
the ordinary course of business, they are better equipped to do so in
the heated crucible of the post-bid environment. Accordingly, many
shareholder choice proponents argue that, once a bid has been made
(or becomes imminent), managers should not be able to adopt de-
fenses that would defeat a hostile offer.48
By contrast, shareholders frequently have relatively less ability to
assess the merits of potential defensive measures implemented
pre-bid, outside the glare of a contest for control. In the cool climate
of ordinary business transactions, shareholder decision-making
capacity is at its least effective. Indeed, shareholders' presumed
decision-making deficit in this context justifies the separation of
47 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 999-1004 (arguing that, when shareholders'
"money is on the line" following a takeover bid offer, they have a great incentive to
make an informed, rather than purely deferential, choice).
48 Lg., id. at 1027-28; Gilson, supra note 40, at 878-79 (arguing that, once a bid is
imminent, managers should not be permitted to employ defenses that interfere with
shareholders' opportunities to tender their shares); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, su-
pra note 40, at 1194-1204 (arguing for managerial passivity in the face of a hostile of-
fer).
As we will discuss, similar arguments apply to pre-bid pure defenses whose ultimate
effect is to grant managers post-bid control over the tender offer process (e.g., a re-
deemable poison pill). bifra note 52 and text accompanying notes 50-53.
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ownership and control that defines the governance of publicly held
firms.
2. Pure Versus Embedded Defenses
A second important distinction pertains to timing, rather than tai-
loring: whether the action is a "pure defense" adopted for the sole
purpose of deterring hostile bids (with little other direct effect on the
operating profile of the firm) or an "embedded defense" that could
serve legitimate business purposes. Because pure defenses have (by
definition) no effects other than to deter managerially disfavored ac-
quisitions, they are likely to be easier for shareholders to evaluate than
are embedded defenses, whose purposes may often be mixed and
therefore difficult to distill.
The distinction between pure and embedded defenses becomes
particularly important if, post-bid, shareholders have the potential ca-
pacity to assess whether to proceed with a tender offer or allow pre-
sent management to remain in control. Pure defenses are measures
that give managers a veto over tender offers, with no other effect on
the operations of the firm. A classic example of such a measure is the
poison pill, which has no effect on firm value except to the extent that
it discourages hostile acquisitions. These defenses confer little bene-
fit on the firm if shareholders are able to evaluate tender offers that
eventually emerge. Accordingly, shareholder choice proponents gen-
erally favor allowing shareholders to exercise control over pure de-
fenses (e.g., nullifying a poison pill), in order to ensure that share-
holders, not managers, control which takeovers succeed."'
Significantly, under many such proposals, shareholders need not
act to negate a pure defense at its inception, but can wait to act until a
tender offer has materialized, analyzing the firm's existing prospects
49 See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 996 (asserting that shareholder authority over or-
dinary business decisions "is not a viable option").
50 Poison pills can be promulgated either in the ordinary course of business or af-
ter a takeover bid has become imminent. They are used to discourage acquisitions by
causing the firm to disgorge value to non-bidder holders of the firm's securities when a
hostile bidder crosses a pre-specified threshold level of ownership. Poison pills are de-
signed to discourage a bidder from ever obtaining the triggering ownership amount,
and therefore, are rarely triggered. Cf WilliamJ. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The
Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming) (questioning
whether acquirers should be so wary of triggering pills).
51 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1027-28 (arguing that boards should not be
permitted to maintain a pure defense, such as a poison pill, if shareholders either vote
for the acquisition or vote against the board in a proxy context).
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in the relatively information-rich context subsequent to a bid."5
Moreover, to evaluate whether to retain a pure defense or accept a
tender offer, shareholders need only compare the merits of the ac-
quirer's bid against their best estimate of the value of the status quo (a
value for which they possess relatively good information). Accord-
ingly, if shareholders can evaluate tender offers post-bid, then courts
can confidently vest them with authority to override pure defenses
(whether adopted pre-bid or post-bid) without fear of reducing the
benefits shareholders obtain from professional management. Under
this view, defenses in the northern half of the matrix might be well• 53
suited to shareholder regulation.
By contrast, regulation of embedded defenses presents a greater
problem. Embedded defenses are actions that managers purport to
take for legitimate (nondefensive) business reasons that also may
deter tender offers (either hostile bids or all bids generally) .5 These
defenses include actions requiring shareholder approval, such as the
decision to classify stock or merge with a firm other than the hostile
bidder. Yet they also include actions managers can take unilaterally,
such as spinning off a subsidiary or adopting change of control provi-
sions in important contracts.
Embedded defenses present particular problems for shareholder
choice proponents because they entail the type of fundamental busi-
ness decisions that are usually best left to professional managers.
52 In the case of pre-bid pure defenses, shareholders can wait to evaluate the de-
fense until a tender offer has materialized, since, by definition, the pure defense nei-
ther imposes legitimate reliance interests in third parties, nor does it impose irreversi-
ble sunk costs on the company.
53 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1027-28 (arguing that boards should not be
able to maintain control over tender offers once shareholders vote for the acquisition
or against the board in a proxy context); Black & Kraakman, supra note 38, at 561-62
(arguing that boards should not be able to maintain pure defenses, like the pill, if
shareholders support a hostile bid). But see Kahan & Rock, supra note 13, at 484-90
(arguing that managerial authority over tender offers may be welfare-enhancing if it
enables managers-better able than shareholders-to implement a selling strategy).
Perhaps the only circumstance under which managers should be allowed to main-
tain a pure defense, choice advocates argue, is when it is used as bargaining leverage to
negotiate a better deal for shareholders. Once the raider has made its tender offer,
proponents contend, management should be required to submit the decision to the
shareholders and should be forced to remove all pure defenses if shareholders vote to
approve the deal. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 975, 1027-29 (arguing that boards
should not be able to maintain pure defenses that would prevent shareholders from
accepting unsolicited tender offers).
54 This includes the defenses that may deter both hostile and friendly deals alike.
See infra Part II.B (discussing how management may target hostile, rather than friendly,
deals through its use of targeted embedded defenses).
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Embedded defenses usually can be justified as serving legitimate busi-
ness purposes, notwithstanding their negative impact on takeovers.
Yet whether an embedded defense in fact enhances or reduces value
for a particular firm depends on the relative magnitudes of these
effects in each case. For some firms, an embedded defense may en-
hance firm value, notwithstanding its negative impact on tender of-
fers, as the embedding action may promise significant investment op-
portunities or gains from trade. For other firms, the same transaction
may do little beyond deterring takeovers, thereby reducing firm value.
It is therefore difficult for shareholders and courts to distinguish
beneficial and wasteful embedded measures on a priori grounds.
While accepting that shareholders are less able to evaluate em-
bedded defenses than pure defenses, some shareholder choice pro-
ponents hold fast to the claim that shareholders should have authority
to regulate at least one class of embedded defenses-those adopted
after a hostile bid becomes imminent. 5 Proponents of this approach
recognize that granting shareholders authority to override embedded
defenses at the post-bid stage would tax shareholder decision-making
capacity heavily, requiring shareholders to compare (a) the value rep-
resented by the tender offer bid, with (b) the value represented by
remaining with existing management, but with a firm that is altered by
the contemplated embedded defense. 6 While this is a heavy burden,
these shareholder choice proponents assert that the post-bid stage so
alters shareholders' decision making-both in terms of the quality of
information and the identity of the shareholders' 7-that shareholders
can exercise informed choice and thus should be vested with ultimate
authority to decide the fate of post-bid embedded defenses.58
E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1028-29 ("Once mechanisms to ensure undis-
torted shareholder choice are in place, boards should not be permitted to block offers
beyond the point necessary for putting together alternatives for shareholder considera-
tion.").
56 The greater the impact of the embedded defense, the more difficult it will be
for shareholders to compare the merits of the altered firm with the value offered in the
bid. Shareholders encountering defenses that do little to alter the existing firm may
be similarly situated to those facing a pure defense. For a firm considering a substan-
tial change, like a merger with a similarly sized or larger firm, it is considerably more
difficult for shareholders to evaluate the future of the altered target.
57 See supra Part .B (explaining how incentives for shareholders to evaluate infor-
mation increase in the post-bid environment).
5' This can be made operational through several means. For example, boards
contemplating a business decision that would defeat the hostile bid could submit the
question to shareholders of whether to accept the bid or to proceed with manage-
ment's new business plan. In doing so, the board can provide shareholders with in-
formation and arguments supporting their preferred course of action. See Bebchuk,
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Nevertheless, and significantly, there does not appear to be any
serious shareholder choice proposal that would give shareholders au-
thority over embedded defenses implemented at the pre-bid stage.
This reticence likely reflects the presumed difficulty that shareholders
(and courts) would have in assessing the relative merits of what oth-• • 59
erwise appears to be an ordinary business decision.
D. The Importance of the Unexamined Fourth Quadrant
As described above, even the strongest shareholder choice pro-
posals are limited to extending shareholder control to all pure de-
fenses and all post-bid defenses: that is, the northern and eastern
three quadrants of Table 1. There exists, however, a fourth quadrant
of the Table that these proposals leave untouched: embedded de-
fenses adopted at the pre-bid stage. Such defenses are transactions
that the board undertakes in the ordinary course of business, ostensi-
bly for legitimate (nondefensive) business purposes, but which also
may have a defensive effect. These measures include those that a firm
might take even if there was no imminent threat of a hostile acquisi-
tion, but that nevertheless deter takeovers. For example, a firm may
choose to merge with another firm or employ a change of control
provision in a contract with a third party primarily to enhance value
yet these measures also may be employed to deter tender offers at the
expense of firm value.
The existence of these defenses has potentially significant implica-
tions for shareholder choice, detailed below.
1. Unregulable Defenses
No leading proponent of shareholder choice has sought to regu-
late managers' authority over all pre-bid embedded defenses, either by
requiring contemporaneous shareholder approval of all transactions
affecting future takeovers or permitting shareholders to invalidate any
such measures ex post, once a bid has emerged.0
supra note 9, at 1000-01 ("[Flollowing the making of an offer, directors can and often
do provide shareholders with new information... about the target's independent
value and how it compares with the price."); Black & Kraakman, supra note 38, at 563
(arguing that boards seeking to accept one transaction and reject a second transaction
offering higher visible value should have to obtain shareholder ratification).
59 E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 996 (asserting that shareholders cannot regulate
pre-bid investment decisions).
W Both current U.S. proposals and European law fall short of regulating all, or
even most, pre-bid embedded defenses. For example, although the United Kingdom's
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As a practical matter, pre-bid embedded defenses are an elusive
target for shareholder oversight because they are adopted in the cool,
information-poor context of everyday business, often well before a
tender offer might ever emerge. Complicating matters is the fact that
these defenses come clothed as otherwise legitimate business transac-
tions that potentially confer significant benefits on the firm.
City Code tightly restricts managers' ability to implement "defensive measures" once a
takeover bid is imminent, it does not regulate managers' adoption of "protective
measures" implemented well in advance of a takeover. Eddy Wymeersch, Problems of
the Regulation of Takeover Bids in Western Europe: A Comparative Survey, in EUROPEAN
TAKEOVERS: LAWAND PRACTICE 95, 122 (KlausJ. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1992).
In response, many European, especially Continental, companies have adopted strong
protective devices that significantly impede takeovers. Id.; see also infta note 72 (dis-
cussing European companies' use of golden share arrangements to deter foreign hos-
tile bidders).
Moreover, Europe's experience with the Thirteenth Directive (the European
Commission's proposal for harmonizing corporate takeover law throughout the Un-
ion), Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Takeover Bids, art. 11, 2003 O.J. (C 45) 6, 7, available at http://
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/ceO45/ceO4520030225enO010017.pdf,
reveals some of the difficulties associated with pre-bid defenses. Following the rejec-
tion of the Thirteenth Directive by the Parliament of the European Union in July 2001,
the European Commission established a High Level Group of Company Law Experts
to consider a rule to govern takeover defenses. See Christian Kirchner & Richard W.
Painter, Takeover Defenses Under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the
New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform, 50 AM. J. COMP.
L. 451, 460-61, 468 n.60 (2002) (describing controversy among EU members concern-
ing the directive). The High Level Group of Company Law Experts explicitly ad-
dressed the problem of managers' use of substitute defenses should the European Un-
ion regulate post-bid defenses. Id. at 468-69. The group concluded that shareholder
authorization should be required for any defenses implemented during an acquisition.
The group rejected proposals to require shareholder authorization of defenses
adopted within eighteen months of a bid, however, on the grounds that pre-bid share-
holders are not sufficiently informed to make such determinations. Id. at 469.
To regulate certain pre-bid defenses-specifically certain shareholder voting struc-
tures, such as "golden shares"-the group proposed a "break through" rule, which
would "nullify and void preferential positions of certain shareholders" for purposes of
a shareholder vote on the takeover bid. Id. at 468-69. This break through rule has
numerous problems. See Coates, supra note 18 (analyzing this rule and concluding
that it is not clearly better than the current legal regime). First, the break through rule
would reduce firm value for those firms where the regulated capital structures are
value enhancing. Second, it would not eliminate the problem of pre-bid defenses be-
cause it leaves untouched various other pre-bid defenses that are functionally equiva-
lent, including the main group of pre-bid defenses identified in this Article. See id. at
7-8 (discussing boards' ability to use alternative defenses, such as stock pyramids and
cross-ownership, to replicate the effects of dual class stock); Kirchner & Painter, supra,
at 470-71 (noting that the High Level Group identified share transfer restrictions, con-
tract provisions, and "pyramid structures" as pre-bid defenses that are practically the
same as those covered by the rule, but still available).
[Vol. 152: 577
PERILS OF SHAREHOLDER CHOICE
Thus, it would not be prudent for shareholders to interfere with
managers' authority over pre-bid embedded defenses because neither
shareholders nor courts have the capacity to regulate these measures.
First, it is neither practical nor prudent to adopt a categorical prohibi-
tion on all pre-bid actions that might deter takeovers. It is not always
possible to determine ex ante whether any given transaction signifi-
cantly impedes acquisitions, particularly when its deterrent effect de-
pends on other actions the board might take. Moreover, even when a
transaction clearly deters takeovers, prohibiting it may frequently de-
prive firms of significant benefits that could (depending on the case)
far outweigh any costs.""
Nor is it either possible or desirable to regulate pre-bid embedded
defenses ex ante, by requiring contemporaneous shareholder
approval of any pre-bid measure that could deter takeovers. The
range of pre-bid embedded defenses is so large that requiring share-
holder authorization of all such actions would dramatically increase
the costs of a great variety of corporate transactions. Moreover,
shareholder voting on such transactions is unlikely to confer signifi-
cant benefits because shareholders are not capable of overseeing or-
dinary business transactions, with or without defensive effects. In-
deed, the foundational premise of the publicly held firm is that
shareholders do not have sufficient incentives to obtain, or capacity to
analyze and motivation to act upon, the information necessary to
• 62
make good decisions regarding ordinary business transactions . The
fact that an ordinary business transaction might deter future (purely
hypothetical) tender offers does not substantially alter this scenario.
Such ordinary transactions are unlikely to generate attention from
analysts, the press, and institutional investors associated with tender
offers. Thus, requiring shareholders to approve any ordinary business
transaction that burdens a future tender offer would force sharehold-
ers to exercise authority in the very circumstance-and over the very
transactions-in which they are least capable of acting effectively.
61 See infta Part II (discussing pre-bid embedded defenses).
62 E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 996 (positing that shareholders are not suffi-
ciently well informed to make investment decisions in the ordinary course of business).
Indeed, for this reason, a number of shareholder choice advocates generally accept the
idea that courts should regulate shark repellents (such as fair price amendments),
notwithstanding that they require shareholder approval. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note
22, at 822-27 (claiming that shareholders approve shark repellent amendments con-
trary to their own self-interest because unsophisticated shareholders are rationally un-
informed about these measures, and sophisticated shareholders find it too costly to
intervene to inform the unsophisticated shareholders).
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Accordingly, granting shareholders such authority would undermine
their ability to retain the benefits of professional managerial control
over ordinary business transactions without conferring the benefits of
63informed shareholder oversight of managers.
Finally, it is also neither desirable nor feasible to regulate such de-
fenses by allowing shareholders or courts (or both) to decide their
fate ex post, once a tender offer has emerged. Many firms benefit not
only from embedding a pre-bid defense in a larger transaction, but
also from being able to commit to that term. For example, embed-
ding change of control provisions in a third-party contract may reduce
the firm's cost of contracting by giving the third party some security
about the future trajectory of the firm. This reduced contracting cost
is partially passed on to shareholders, but only to the extent that the
firm can commit to abide by the term once a tender offer emerges.
Firms would likely not obtain such benefits if third parties expect
shareholders (or courts) to invalidate such measures ex post in order
to proceed with a tender offer. 64
2. The Problem of Substitution
The existing debate over shareholder choice generally has pro-
ceeded on the premise that the challenge of regulating pre-bid em-
bedded defenses (i.e., the southwest quadrant of Figure 1) only affects
the domain of shareholder choice, and not the merits of shareholder
choice itself. 65 Yet further examination reveals that the existence of
See Arlen, supra note 18, at 920 (observing that corporate constituents cannot
write contracts that simply prohibit all pre-bid antitakeover devices because it is often
hard to distinguish an antitakeover device from a legitimate business action and fur-
thermore, shareholders cannot anticipate in advance all the possible measures that
managers might employ).
64 See supra note 60 (discussing problems with the European Union's proposed
break through rule).
A few scholars examining U.S. law have observed that shareholder choice might
induce managers to employ substitute defenses, but they generally have not explored
the degree to which this possibility indeed undermines the case for shareholder
choice. See Arlen, supra note 18, at 928 (arguing that regulating existing defensive
measures may reduce shareholder welfare if it induces managers to employ alternative
defenses that are more destructive of firm value); Kahan & Rock, supra note 29, at 903
("[A]s long as boards retain.., the power to manage the company, a unilateral, board-
opposed governance measure is likely to induce a strategic response by the board.");
cf Atreya Chakraborty & Richard Arnott, Takeover Defenses and Dilution: A Welfare
Analysis, 36J. FIN. & QUANTITATInE ANALYSIS 311, 311-12, 329 (2001) (proposing that
hostile offers may provide less discipline on managers than theorists have suggested
because the primary gain from hostile tender offers may arise from undoing the effects
of value-reducing defenses that managers would not have adopted if not threatened by
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these types of defenses may be far more significant than most com-
mentators have heretofore appreciated. The very existence of un-
regulable, and potentially wasteful, pre-bid embedded defenses poten-
tially undermines the normative case for shareholder choice because
regulating pure and post-bid defenses may reduce shareholder welfare
if managers respond by substituting into pre-bid embedded defenses
that impose greater costs on the firm.
Managerial substitution into fourth quadrant defenses is a poten-
tially serious concern because shareholder choice proposals neither
remove managers' incentives to entrench themselves nor ensure
managerial passivity. Rather, they merely regulate certain forms of
managerial entrenchment.
Under all shareholder choice regimes, managers would retain
other means of entrenchment and could be expected to employ these
unregulated defenses to protect their tenure. Accordingly, rather
than surrendering their authority, managers subject to shareholder
choice can simply relocate their entrenchment activities further up-
stream, embedding defenses in unregulable pre-bid decisions that ar-
guably have nonentrenchment justifications. Moreover, managers
may be able to implement such measures even when they are value
potential hostile takeovers in the first place); supra note 18 (citing authorities that dis-
cuss European proposals to regulate defensive measures).
Nevertheless, a number of scholars have discussed the implications of substitute
defenses for proposals to regulate particular defenses, even if they have not examined
the broader implications of substitute defenses. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al.,
Stock Pyramids, Cross Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanism and Agency Costs
of Separating Control from Cash-flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP
295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2002) (showing how managers can use pyramids and cross-
holding structures to achieve the same control and cash-flow rights available through
dual class structures); Gilson, supra note 22, at 818-22, 887-90 (recognizing that
regulation of post-bid shark repellents may induce substitution into unregulated, pre-
bid shark repellents, but concluding that managers would not employ the least tar-
geted (and most unregulable) of these pre-bid measures); Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating
Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 843-44 (1987)
(examining both dual class common stock and substitutes that accomplish the same
result); see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds:
Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931, 954 (discussing
managers' defensive use of debt covenants with change of control puts triggered only
by a hostile offer); Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15
CARDoZo L. REv. 987, 1006-07 (1994) (discussing managers' ability to use the issuance
of sweetheart preferred stock, preferred stock issued to a corporate insider, to defend
against a hostile offer).
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reducing if the value-reducing defenses mimic measures that enhance
value for some firms!('
Furthermore, shareholders cannot rely on nonlegal restraints on
managers' behavior-such as the threat of a proxy contest or the mar-
ket for managerial services-to deter managers from adopting such
value-reducing measures. The case for shareholder choice itself is
predicated on the view that neither the proxy process nor the market
for managers adequately deters managers from employing antitake-
over defenses at the expense of shareholders. There is no reason to
expect these measures to deter pre-bid embedded measures if they do
not deter pre-bid pure defenses.
Indeed, the proxy process and market for managers are likely to
be even less effective in the case of pre-bid embedded defenses than
in the case of pure defenses because, in the latter case, shareholders
often are unable to determine whether the measure is value enhanc-
ing or value reducing at the time it is adopted. To the extent that
shareholders cannot reliably determine whether to commend or sanc-
tion managers for adopting a pre-bid embedded measure, alternative
disciplinary measures that depend on shareholders are unlikely to be
effective.6 7
" Some readers may identify our argument with the intuitions generated within
the multitasking literature, which examines the problem of providing incentives to
agents when only certain aspects of their actions are observable. In such circum-
stances, it may be optimal to "soften" incentives as to observable actions so that agents
spend more time on unobservable actions. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Mult-
task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L.,
ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991). Notwithstanding this similarity, our analysis is in many ways
distinct from the multitasking literature. First, multitasking models generally examine
situations in which an agent must undertake multiple activities-e.g., increasing speed
and enhancing quality-each of which independently affect the principal's profits, but
only some of which are observable. To be sure, in our framework shareholders would
like to deter numerous types of managerial action that deter acquisitions, but cannot
deter some without exacerbating others. Significantly, however, the various actions
that managers may take in our framework are not independent, but may be mutually
exclusive means for affecting the likelihood of a tender offer. Moreover, the reason
shareholders cannot deter each of them individually is unrelated to observability of the
actions; indeed, shareholders usually can observe pre-bid embedded defenses. Rather,
shareholders cannot regulate such measures because they cannot determine ex ante
whether certain defenses enhance or reduce firm value. Finally, the classic multitask-
ing approach focuses only on optimal contracting practices, holding constant the un-
derlying legal regime. By contrast, our analysis examines the optimal structure of the
legal regime itself, accounting both for incentives to employ substitute defenses and
likely contractual responses in the shadow of this regime.
67 Moreover, even if shareholders can determine that a pre-bid measure is value
reducing, it may not be in their interests to remove managers through a proxy contest.
Shareholder incentives to change management depend on producing a sufficient
[Vol. 152:577
PERILS OF SHAREHOLDER CHOICE
Accordingly, the desirability of a shareholder choice regime turns
critically on the threat that managers may substitute into unregulable
defenses that may place a greater net burden on firm value than those
defenses that a shareholder choice regime would place under scru-
tiny. It is to this inquiry that we now turn.
II. AVAILABILITY OF PRE-BID EMBEDDED DEFENSES
In this Part, we move from logical taxonomy to practical applica-
tion, examining the extent to which managers may realistically be able
to embrace pre-bid embedded defenses as a response to a shareholder
choice regime. An important starting point for this inquiry is to ex-
amine existing corporate practices themselves, assessing the extent to
which such practices already provide an institutional template for un-
regulable defenses. We find that there is a cornucopia of alternative
pre-bid embedded measures that managers could employ to retain
control over or deter acquisitions should they be prevented from em-
ploying more targeted, post-bid measures.68
Of particular importance, we identify a variety of practices that,
under current law, managers generally employ solely for their value-
enhancing, nondefensive effects, but which could just as easily serve to
embed a defense at the expense of firm value. Existing pre-bid "blan-
ket" defenses (which deter hostile and friendly deals alike) are par-
ticularly likely to be used for legitimate business purposes where cur-
rently employed because, under current law, managers have no need
improvement in firm value to outweigh the costs of a proxy contest. Although ex ante
shareholders might benefit from threatening to remove a board that adopts defenses,
after the fact it may not be in their interest to do so because many pre-bid embedded
defenses cannot be removed by the board post-bid. Thus, once a nonremovable de-
fense is adopted, shareholders may have little expectation of an acquisition and may
obtain the greatest expected share value under current management. Accordingly,
when shareholders cannot eliminate the effect of defenses by changing the current
management team, they may have little reason to change current management. Cf
Jennifer H. Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 712-17 (1997) (discussing how the
commitment problem renders ineffective principals' ex ante threats to sanction wrong-
ful agents because agents know that ex post, should a wrong occur, principals may ob-
tain little benefit from actually carrying out the threat).
Board efforts to retain control need not be limited to rearranging internal cor-
porate affairs. Managers can be expected to respond to an effort by the Delaware
Court to implement shareholder choice by lobbying the legislature for stronger anti-
takeover protections.
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to deter friendly deals when they can 'just say no" to hostile raiders
alone.69
While, at present, managers generally employ such measures
when they benefit the firm, managers subject to a shareholder choice
regime would have an incentive to resort to such defenses-even at
the expense of shareholder welfare-if precluded from employing
more targeted defenses by shareholder choice. Courts could not eas-
ily regulate such substitute defenses, however, if managers can imple-
ment defenses that mimic legitimate, value-enhancing business trans-
actions. Thus, the evidence we present of legitimate, value-enhancing
transactions that could be employed for defensive purposes, strength-
ens the claim for the "unregulability" of various pre-bid embedded
defenses.
A. The Degree of Targeting
To evaluate the risk of managerial substitution into pre-bid em-
bedded defenses-and the difficulty courts would face in regulating
them-it is useful to distinguish between targeted pre-bid measures
designed to enable boards to retain control over which bid succeeds
(without imposing any costs on friendly deals), and "blanket" de-
fenses, embedded deep within other business decisions, that deter all
acquisitions, friendly and hostile alike.
Managers subject to a shareholder choice regime would find tar-
geted defenses to be the most attractive because they deter hostile of-
fers while maintaining management's ability to enter into friendly
deals. Of course, these defenses also are the least likely to serve bona
fide nondefensive interests and, thus, are the most vulnerable to court
Managers who are not selling control of the firm can employ pure defenses or
post-bid defenses to 'Just say no" to all acquirers. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3
(discussing the lack of obstacles Delaware corporation managers have in erecting de-
fenses to prevent hostile takeovers when they are not selling control of the firm);
see Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 6, at 904-07 (providing evidence that
managers who employ poison pills in concert with effective classified boards can fend
off hostile offers); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 65, at 935-36 (discussing the defensive
use of "hostile trigger" change of control provisions in bond covenants that impose
costs on the target only in the event of a hostile acquisition). Given this discretion,
one would expect managers to favor those defenses that deter an unwanted bid at
minimal cost, both to the firm and to the managers. We would, therefore, expect
managers to employ pure defenses wherever possible. Moreover, given the potential
gains to managers of friendly deals under the existing regime, we would expect
managers to avoid defenses that deter both friendly and hostile acquisition-unless
such defenses provide sufficient compensating benefits in terms of increased firm
value.
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regulation. Nevertheless, this Part shows that numerous targeted
pre-bid measures exist that would be difficult for courts to regulate.
To the extent managers are able to employ these defenses, share-
holder choice would do little to achieve increased shareholder control
over hostile acquisitions.
Moreover, bringing these close substitutes to pure defenses within
the realm of judicial regulation would not eliminate the problems
presented by managerial substitution because there are a range of less
targeted (and more embedded) defenses to which managers could
almost always resort, including blanket defenses that impede friendly
and hostile deals alike. Blanket defenses pose a particular challenge
for shareholder choice because they are especially likely to serve
legitimate, nondefensive business purposes. Thus, they are the least
potentially subject to regulation, and yet also are unambiguously more
costly to the firm than are pure defenses. While there are few legiti-
mate, nondefensive reasons to condition a corporate transaction on
whether a tender offer is hostile, there are many legitimate reasons to
condition one on a change of control generally. Moreover, managers'
claims that blanket defenses serve a legitimate purpose are enhanced
by the price managers pay for adopting them: the deterrence of
friendly deals (and perhaps even the altering of the operating struc-
ture of the firm).
Accordingly, even under the strongest plausible shareholder
choice regime, there is a point of generality at which courts could not
efficiently invalidate defensive measures, either ex ante or ex post.70
Nor can these defenses be regulated by requiring ex ante shareholder
votes on all pre-bid embedded defenses. Shareholders would have to
evaluate these transactions in the cool climate of ordinary business,
when they have neither sufficient incentives nor capacity to make the
complex business decisions entailed in determining whether the
benefits associated with a pre-bid defense exceed the expected costs of
deterring a potential takeover.7
70 See supra Part I.D (discussing the difficulty of expanding shareholder choice into
the fourth quadrant); infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the difficulties of regulating blanket
pre-bid embedded defenses).
71 See supra Part 1.D (discussing the expansion of shareholder power into all pre-
and post-bid defenses).
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B. Retaining Managerial Control over Tender Offers
Managers subject to a shareholder choice regime that prohibits
the preclusive use of pure defenses or post-bid defenses nevertheless
could employ a variety of targeted pre-bid embedded defenses to re-
tain control of the tender offer process-deterring hostile bids, while
permitting those friendly acquisitions that benefit managers. Courts
could easily invalidate some of these targeted pre-bid defenses, but
they could not interfere with others without fear of interfering with
otherwise legitimate business arrangements. This Section discusses
some of these arrangements.
1. Targeted Defenses Supported by Shareholder Approval
Under existing statutory authority, managers can alter how the
corporation is structured and financed in ways that enable them to
retain considerable control over which, if any, takeovers succeed.
These defenses are particularly difficult to regulate because share-
holders often explicitly approve the power granted to boards to em-
ploy these mechanisms. Courts cognizant of legitimate reasons why
shareholders might approve such measures could not easily invalidate
defensive financing arrangements to which shareholders consent.
72
For example, managers can retain control over the takeover proc-
ess through the use of different classes of stock. For instance, man-
agement can have the firm issue two types of stock, one of which is
publicly traded and the other of which is in the hands of management
(or confederates thereof). This latter class would be a strong deter-
rent to a hostile offer to the extent that consent of a majority of the
shares of this class is required for any corporate combination.73
72 Courts could legitimately defer to shareholder approval of defensive capital
structures even when such structures-such as dual class common stock or sweetheart
preferred-arguably operate as pure defenses if courts conclude that shareholders may
have legitimate reasons for granting managers authority over tender offers. These rea-
sons include the fear of substitute defenses discussed here, as well as the possibility that
managers may be better able to sell the firm, as discussed in Kahan & Rock, supra note
13, at 484-90.
73 For example, Ford's Class B stock, which is primarily held by insiders, comprises
around four percent of the total shares outstanding, but accounts for roughly forty
percent of shareholder voting power. FORD MOTOR Co., 2003 ANNUAL MEETING PROXY
STATEMENT 57 (April 28, 2003), available at http://www.ford.com/NR/rdonlyres/
e2wotuuzdzd6yhvdq4nkfubisyvy76mcizsdn4hefx5jkbttf2epnxg6qiutu2bikh4zqechr34t
p4y6d2bzg2tpnh/2003-proxy-statement.pdf. Coca Cola and General Motors have
dual class stock as well. COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES, INC., NOTICE OF 2003 ANNUAL
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Managers can facilitate their ability to use dual class stock by
obtaining shareholder approval for "blank check preferred" charter
provisions. Blank check preferred stock contains open terms that can
be specified by the board at the time it is issued. The vast majority of
publicly held firms currently have such charter provisions . Boards
armed with blank check preferred charter provisions can circumvent
any shareholder choice regulation of post-bid defenses by issuing de-
fensive preferred stock in the ordinary course of business.
Specifically, managers can employ blank check preferred stock to
retain control over tender offers (even under an aggressive share-
holder choice regime) by issuing preferred stock with veto rights over
any corporate combination and placing a significant amount of the
stock in ostensibly independent, but nevertheless "friendly," hands
(sweetheart preferred).' Sweetheart preferred stock is a particularly
MEETING OF SHAREOWNERS 4 (2003), available at http://www.shareholder.com/
common/edgar/804055/931763-03-665/03-00.pdf; GENERAL MOTORS CORP., PROXY
STATEMENT 1 (2003), available at http://www.gm.com/company/investor-informa-
tion/docs/stockholder info/gmpxy/pxy03/GmO3ps2.pdf.
In Europe, firms have employed dual class stock to deter hostile offers by foreign
bidders by selling special "golden shares" to the government. Paul Hofheinz, EU Seems
Set for a Takeover Makeover, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at All. For example, until re-
cently, the U.K. government had "golden shares" of at least twenty-six companies. Id.
Local city governments, such as London, and other national European governments
have also had "golden shares" in important firms. Id. Recently, the European Court of
Judges issued a series of decisions that restrict companies' ability to employ golden
shares. Id. However, managers retain the ability to adopt a wide variety of protective
devices-adopted before a bid is imminent-to thwart takeovers. SeeJohannes Adolff,
Turn of the Tide?. The "Golden Share"Judgments of the European Court ofJustice and the Lib-
eralization of the European Capital Markets, 3 GERMAN L.J. 1, 2 (2002), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=170 (noting that golden share ar-
rangements are strictly scrutinized by courts when employed by European Union
member states).
74 In 2000, for example, over ninety percent of publicly listed firms had some form
of blank check preferred stock. Investor Responsibility Research Center, at http://
www.irrc.com (last visited Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter IRRC database].
7' Managers can ensure the loyalty of their "sweethearts" through a variety of
means: selling to an investor with a well-developed (and profitable) reputation for be-
ing friendly to management; inserting contractual provisions that limit defection; re-
taining the option to call the investor's position; or making profitable side contracts
(e.g., consulting deals) which could be lost in an acquisition. Rock, supra note 65, at
1004-05.
Alternatively, preferred stock can be issued with change of control puts, which, for
example, enable the holder to redeem the stock at a considerable premium either
upon the acquisition by a raider of some threshold ownership amount or upon a
change in control of the board following a proxy contest. Such a redemption pre-
mium would drive up the cost of any such acquisition, making hostile deals considera-
bly less attractive than friendly ones. The deterrent effect of such provisions can be
enhanced to the extent that the firm employs standard debt covenants limiting the
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potent defense given Delaware's antitakeover statute, Section 203,
which effectively requires a hostile raider (proceeding without board
approval) to obtain approval of at least 85% of the shares in order to
effect a corporate combination within three years of its initial acquisi-
tion of at least 15% of the target's stock. 6 Thus, management can
create a significant impediment to hostile deals by placing even 10-
12% of the voting power in friendly hands. 7 Moreover, courts would
be particularly unable to regulate sweetheart preferred issued stock
during the ordinary course of business, for this would entail a deter-
mination that certain shareholders are too "management friendly" to
78be permitted to own certain types of preferred stock .
redemption of capital stock. Moreover, these provisions would be considerably more
difficult for a court to invalidate than a poison pill because they grant rights to third
parties who presumably paid good value for them. It is likely, however, that preferred
stock with "hostile only" change of control provisions would be invalidated by a court
pursuing a strong form of shareholder choice. Preferred stock with blanket change of
control puts, however, might be more difficult to invalidate. Such blanket provisions
are discussed in the next Section. Infra Part II.C.
76 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001). Specifically, under section 203, a raider
who acquires 15% or more of the stock of a company (and becomes an interested
shareholder) cannot effect a corporate combination within three years of the acquisi-
tion unless (1) the board of the target approved the deal prior to the raider becoming
an interested shareholder; (2) the raider acquires 85% of the outstanding non-
management-held voting stock in the initial transaction that made her an interested
shareholder; or (3) subsequent to the raider becoming an interested shareholder, the
acquisition of the corporation is approved by the target's board and voted for by
66 2/3% of the outstanding disinterested shares. Id. Managers can reduce the risk of
a toehold proxy contest through the use of a staggered board. See Bebchuk, Coates &
Subramanian, supra note 6, at 890 (explaining that the delay and multiple elections
caused by staggered boards render them powerful antitakeover defenses).
77 See Rock, supra note 65, at 1001 (stating that "a friendly non-management
shareholder holding 10% or so can go a long way towards blocking any hostile tender
offer").
For example, in an effort to defend against a hostile bid from Shamrock, Polaroid
sold two special series of preferred stock representing approximately 10% of all votes
to Corporate Partners, an investment fund managed by Lazard Freres & Co. Shamrock
Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 283 (Del. Ch. 1989). Corporate Part-
ners advertised itself as providing insulation from hostile deals, thereby bonding itself
to management through its desire to preserve its reputation. Id. at 281. Management
further ensured Corporate Partners' loyalty by both retaining the right to call the stock
and giving Corporate Partners the right to sell the stock back to the firm for an annual
return of 28-30% should Polaroid be acquired by anyone other than Shamrock. Id. at
284. Faced with voting stock in management-friendly hands, Shamrock abandoned its
hostile bid. Rock, supra note 65, at 992. Similarly, Salomon, Gillette, US Airways, and
Champion International have each defended against hostile acquisitions by granting
significant (8-12%) voting power to Warren Buffett through the sale of preferred stock
(apparently at a discount). Id. at 991-94.
78 See id. at 1007 (noting that Delaware courts generally have been reluctant to en-
join the issuance of preferred stock in sweetheart preferred cases).
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Managers also can retain considerable control over tender offers
by obtaining charter provisions that require supermajority consent for
any corporate combination. "Fair price amendments" requiring, for
example, approval of the voting power of eighty-five percent of the
stock for any combination can significantly increase the costs of an• • • 79
acquisition. Moreover, such provisions also increase managers'
power to control the tender offer process to the extent that either
shareholders defer to management's recommendation or managers
control a sufficient stake to block a hostile deal.
These are only two of the pre-bid embedded defenses that man-
agers could use to retain considerable control to defeat hostile acqui-
sitions while favoring those that benefit them."0 Courts cannot easily
regulate these mechanisms, however, as they also may serve legitimate,
nondefensive business purposes and often are adopted with share-
holder consent. Nevertheless, courts should be wary of creating in-
centives for managers to substitute into these measures-through
adoption of shareholder choice-because the requirement of ante
shareholder approval is not sufficient to preclude managers from em-
ploying such measures in ways that reduce shareholders' welfare.8 '
79 While less common than blank check preferred, supermajority and fair price
provisions are present in between fifteen and twenty percent of publicly traded firms.
IRRC database, supra note 74.
so For example, BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce have employed an alternative
approach to thwart hostile tender offers: they limit any single shareholder to owner-
ship of only fifteen percent of the company. Hofheinz, supra note 73, at A12. In addi-
tion, BAE requires that half of the board of directors and both the chairman and chief
executive officer be British subjects. Id.
81 This is of particular concern because managers often obtain the requisite ap-
proval for such defenses when the firm initially goes public. To the extent that the
IPO market is inefficient, managers may obtain authority to adopt such defenses even
when they reduce shareholder welfare. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt
Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 716 (2003) (explaining that when
only a minority of pre-IPO shareholders expect to remain with the firm after the IPO,
they have an incentive to adopt antitakeover arrangements because they obtain the full
benefits of entrenchment but bear only part of the cost of reduced IPO share price);
Klausner, supra note 26, at 23 (explaining that managers seek takeover defenses when
the resulting expected private benefits are greater than the expected reductions in
their shares); cf Bernard S. Black & RonaldJ. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47J. FIN. ECON. 243, 261 (1998) (asserting
that venture capitalists can motivate entrepreneurs ex ante by promising to exit
through an IPO should the company succeed, and noting that exit is made all the
more valuable by defensive charter provisions insulating the entrepreneur from a hos-
tile acquisition).
Moreover, even after the shares are initially sold, corporate governance arrange-
ments may still be inefficient and nonetheless be approved by shareholders. See
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Yet, even so, courts should be wary of overriding the results of a
shareholder vote since they most likely do not possess sufficient in-
formation to determine what course of action shareholders should
have taken8 2
2. Targeted Defenses Not Requiring Shareholder Approval
Managers also can retain considerable control over tender offers
through mechanisms that do not require shareholder approval. For
instance, managers can structure spin-offs and strategic acquisitions
to deter tender offers. As an example, a company can deter bids by
placing the firm's most valuable operating assets (or crown jewels) in
a spin-off subsidiary governed by a voting trust. In this case, even if
the board of the subsidiary changes, control of the voting trust does
not.8 3 Although courts may readily subject such measures to share-
holder oversight when adopted post-bid-when shareholders' deci-
sion-making capacity is at its peak-they cannot do so when they are
adopted in the course of ordinary business when courts cannot rely on
shareholders to assess their validity.
Management also may be able to structure its own contracts in or-
der to impose significant costs on hostile raiders. This can be
achieved, for example, by incorporating change of control provisions
in their employment contracts that permit managers to leave immedi-
84
ately upon a change of control with substantial severance packages.
Bebchuk, supra, at 11-15 (arguing that shareholders may approve provisions granting
boards control over takeovers that are inefficient).
82 This is particularly the case to the extent that shareholders may conclude that
firm value is higher when managers have control over tender offers (both for the rea-
sons given in this Article and for others). See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 13, at 18
(arguing that managerial control may increase value because managers are better able
to implement a selling strategy).
13 See Thompson v. Enstar Corp., No. 7643, 1984 WIL 8240, at *5 (Del. Ch.June 20,
1984) (upholding Enstar's lockup of a deal with Unimar by giving it voting control of
its most valuable asset, Enstar Indonesia, through use of a voting trust, irrespective of
whether a larger corporate combination is consummated).
s Managers' power to influence bids could be particularly strong if they act in
concert, threatening a hostile bidder with a mass exodus (the so-called 'Jonestown de-
fense"). See Leonard I. Reiser, Corporate Takeovers: A Glossary of Terms and Tactics, CASE
& COM., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 35, 44 (describing the Jonestown defense as a suicidal tac-
tic on the part of managers of the target company). An acquirer faced with a mass
exodus of management may be unwilling to proceed with a hostile bid even if it had
planned to fire management eventually because acquirers often need existing man-
agement to train new management. Moreover, shareholders may be unwilling to ap-
prove a corporate combination if faced with a potential mass exodus because they
know they would suffer greatly if the merger were approved (triggering managerial
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In addition, managers may be able to entrench themselves
through measures that accentuate their idiosyncratic value to the
firm." For example, managers may be able to set up organizational
structures, establish internal lines of communication, and implement
corporate cultures that depend critically on their own managerial
skills. By making themselves more valuable to the firm, managers may
be able to influence which acquisitions succeed by agreeing to work
86for some acquirers post-acquisition and refusing to work for others .
Finally, managers can discourage hostile bidders by refusing to
share private information (or by doing so only grudgingly). Private
information is particularly important for companies with numerous
exit) yet never completed. Cf John C. Coates IV & Cuhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side
Model of M&A Lockups: Theoy and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REv. 307, 347 (2000) (finding
that 24% of negotiated mergers agreed to between 1988 and 1999 were not completed
when there was no lockup or breakup fee, and that even when there was both a lockup
and breakup fee, 5.3% of such deals were not completed).
Hostile bidders could, of course, reduce managers' incentives to employ this de-
fense by offering appropriate incentives for managers to remain. Yet this does not
eliminate the problem created by the threat of managerial exodus. The amount man-
agers could extract from a hostile raider to induce them to remain would reduce the
hostile bidder's incentive to bid (by increasing costs) and enable managers to appro-
priate some of the gains from the deal as private benefits.
85 Thus, for example, an acquirer considering an acquisition of Donna Karan In-
ternational would be unlikely to attempt a hostile acquisition given that Donna Karan's
own employment contract is terminable upon a change of control. Donna Karan In-
ternational Inc. Prospectus, SEC Reg. No. 333-3600, at 76 (June 28, 1996).
86 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case
of Manager-Specific Investments, 25J. FIN. ECON. 123, 123-24, 134-36 (1989) (arguing that
managers can entrench themselves by pursuing projects they are particularly well-
suited to manage, even when these are not profit maximizing); see also Aaron S. Edlin
& Joseph E. Stiglitz, Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficien-
cies, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1301 (1995) (explaining that managers can discourage poten-
tial challengers through investments that increase rivals' perceived uncertainty about
the firm's prospects).
Although it is difficult to garner hard evidence about the degree to which firms
engage in such practices, a recent study of employee involvement in Fortune 1000
firms is suggestive. EDWARD E. LAWLER III ET AL., ORGANIZING FOR HIGH PERFORM-
ANCE 21-26 (2001). From 1987 though 1996, while overall hostile acquisition activity
was ebbing in the wake of Delaware's antitakeover statute, firms became increasingly
likely to involve their employees in quasi-managerial power and information-sharing
practices. Such programs include job enrichment or redesign programs, self-
management teams, mini-business units, and employee policy committees. Id. at 48-53.
During the late 1990s, however, as hostile bid activity began to approach its pre-1987
levels, such employee management initiatives fell from favor, decreasing in frequency
to their pre-statute levels. Id. One interpretation of this trend (though certainly one
of many) is that the credible threat of hostile acquisitions gives managers an incentive
to centralize information management and decision-making authority in order to
make the managers indispensable.
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off-balance sheet arrangements and for companies whose value de-
pends to a considerable degree on the results of new initiatives (for
example, new drugs).
C. Impediments to All Changes of Control
Even if the problems posed by managerial substitution into tar-
geted pre-bid embedded defenses can be redressed through more
stringent regulation of any measure that grants boards control over
tender offers, this would not solve the challenge posed by pre-bid em-
bedded defenses. Even if courts could preclude the use of any and all
targeted pre-bid embedded defenses, managers could employ blanket
pre-bid embedded measures that impede all types of acquisitions, hos-
tile or otherwise. These measures could impose much greater costs
on the firm, potentially leaving shareholders wistful for the days of the
poison pill. Moreover, shareholder choice may provide managers
with incentives to employ such defenses, notwithstanding the obvious
cost to managers of the resulting reduction in friendly deals.87 As
many of these measures currently serve important and legitimate
(nondefensive) business purposes, courts could not prohibit the use
of such measures without assuming excessive managerial authority
over publicly held firms' business transactions or doing violence to the
foundational precept of managerial authority over ordinary business
transactions.
1. Change of Control Provisions in Third-Party Agreements
Managers precluded from employing targeted defenses could
nevertheless entrench themselves by erecting barriers to acquisitions
generally. One way to do this would be to insert change of control
provisions in the firm's contractual arrangements with third parties.
Change of control provisions can be-and currently are-
incorporated into a variety of contracts, including intellectual prop-
erty licenses, leases, joint ventures, debt and equity financing,
union contracts, and employee stock option plans.8" These provisions
87 Compare infta Part IV.C.2 (showing that shareholder choice can induce manag-
ers to employ value-reducing blanket defenses that they would not employ under a
managerial choice regime), with Gilson, supra note 40, at 887-90 (arguing that the risk
of substitution from post-bid defenses to untargeted pre-bid defenses is not particularly
significant because managers will eschew such untargeted pre-bid defenses because
they are too costly for managers).
88 See supra note 75 (discussing change of control provisions in preferred stock).
[Vol. 152: 577
PERILS OF SHAREHOLDER CHOICE
generally either terminate the contract or impose a penalty on the
target in the event of a change of control or corporate combination s9
friendly or otherwise. 0
Change of control provisions are difficult to regulate because they
generally are adopted well in advance of a tender offer, and they serve
the important, legitimate (nondefensive) purpose of protecting third-
party interests (thereby facilitating certain welfare-improving transac-• 91
tions). Third parties contracting with firms often have good reasons
Although there is not, to our knowledge, a reliable database detailing all variations on
change of control provisions, in 2000 nearly two-thirds of all publicly traded firms had
some sort of provision in their employment contracts or collective bargaining agree-
ments. IRRC database, supra note 74.
'9 Change of control provisions vary in how they define the triggering event.
Managers can draft them to ensure that they cover any transaction a hostile raider
might wish to accomplish.
90 In this Section, we focus on blanket change of control provisions. Nevertheless,
if courts failed to regulate all targeted defenses, managers could instead employ
change of control provisions that are triggered solely by a hostile change of control:
for example, an acquisition not preceded by board consent or a change in the majority
of the board in a single year. Such a provision would, in effect, replicate the effects of
the poison pill. Indeed, managers regularly employed "hostile trigger" change of con-
trol provisions prior to embracing the poison pill and classified board.
Analysis of bond covenants employed in the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals that,
prior to the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout, almost all bonds contained covenants that
encumbered only hostile takeovers and proxy contests, usually without regard to their
effect on bond values. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 65, at 970, 970-72. While man-
agement subsequently reduced their use of such hostile trigger covenants in the late
1980s, id. at 974, the history of hostile trigger change of control provisions reveals
managers' willingness and ability to employ such provisions as substitute defenses.
One would expect the adoption of shareholder choice to cause managers to reem-
brace hostile trigger debt covenants if permitted to do so.
Hostile trigger debt covenants are potentially even more effective entrenchment
devices than are pure poison pills (unassociated with a classified board). Shareholders
cannot use proxy contests to circumvent these measures because these provisions often
are written so that a successful proxy contest itself triggers the change of control pen-
alty. See id. at 937-43 (describing debt covenants with this feature). Thus, they signifi-
cantly increase the expected cost to shareholders of voting for a deal, even if the ac-
quirer is willing to proceed notwithstanding the penalty. Hostile trigger covenants
raise the risks to shareholders of proceeding with a hostile deal because shareholders
recognize that they could potentially bear the full penalty with no resulting gain
should the acquirer fail to consummate the deal following a shareholder vote to oust
the board. Id.
91 The latter makes such contracts more difficult to invalidate than lockups, for
example, because the primary purpose of a lockup is to favor one bidder over another.
To the extent one accepts shareholder primacy post-bid, shareholders should deter-
mine which bidder to favor. Shareholders cannot, however, assess the merits of
change of control provisions in pre-bid contracts-at least not if the presumptions un-
derlying title 8, section 141 (a) of the Delaware Code and the business judgment rule
are correct.
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for insisting on change of control provisions. Many contracts are
long-term and, thus, necessarily incomplete. In such cases, the value
of the contract depends critically on the trustworthiness and reliability
of the contracting party. In addition, a party granting a license may
seek to protect its own market position by seeking to control the iden-
tity of those who use its license. For example, the party may want to
ensure that a competitor does not obtain the license. Accordingly, a
contracting party may value highly the ability to protect itself from
changes in the identity of the other party to the contract through a
change of control provision that allows the third party to terminate
the contract should the other party's management change. Granting
such a provision can increase the joint benefits of the contract to both
parties.
In some circumstances, simple termination of the contract may
not fully eliminate the potential harm to the third party of a change
of control. In these circumstances, third parties also may legitimately
insist on a "penalty" change of control provision, which grants a bene-
fit to the third party (at the expense of the target) in the event of a
change of control. For example, the holder of an intellectual prop-
erty right licensed to a firm may suffer damage should a competitor
purchase the licensee firm, even if the change of control terminates
the license. Through purchase of the licensee, the competitor neces-
sarily obtains considerable proprietary information about the licen-
sor's intellectual property. To redress the costs to the licensor of this
eventuality, it may legitimately insist on a penalty change of control.
The claim that both termination and penalty change of control
provisions may serve legitimate (nondefensive) business purposes
(thereby benefiting shareholders) is supported by evidence, presented
below, that firms currently employ such change of control provisions,
burdening friendly and hostile deals alike. Under current law, gener-
ally managers have little reason to employ such measures for en-
trenchment purposes because they can deter hostile deals through
other means that do not also discourage friendly deals. Thus, when
managers do employ such measures, they generally are doing so for
nonentrenchment reasons-because the third party insisted on the
provision, and managers concluded that the expected benefit of in-
cluding it exceeds the expected cost. Accordingly, courts could not
simply prohibit such measures categorically without adverse conse-
quences for certain firms.
Such measures present a challenge for proponents of shareholder
choice because, under shareholder choice, managers could easily use
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change of control provisions to entrench themselves. 2 Moreover,
managers employing such provisions for entrenchment purposes of-
ten would reduce firm value, even if they employed provisions osten-
sibly identical to those that enhance value in other circumstances, if
shareholder choice motivated managers to use change of control
provisions in situations where they do not significantly reduce the
firm's costs of contracting with third parties.
a. Termination clauses
The simplest change of control provisions give a third party the
right to terminate the contract upon a change of control. For exam-
ple, many intellectual property licenses,joint venture agreements, and
leases have change of control provisions that terminate the licenses
upon change of control.93
Termination clauses are a particularly effective takeover deterrent
in those circumstances where the target can rely on the third party not
to assign the contract to the acquirer at the original price. Managers
can rely on third parties either to terminate the contract or to impose
significant additional costs in return for a new contract in at least
three situations.
First, the third party will not assign the contract to an acquirer
under its existing terms when the contract has become substantially
more valuable than when originally signed. For example, a firm with
a long-term license to a product issued at an early stage in the devel-
opment process (e.g., a drug) may find itself with an extraordinarily
valuable license once the true value of the product is known. Should
the license have a change of control termination clause, the firm may
be more valuable as a stand-alone entity than acquired because, if the
firm is acquired, the licensor can use the threat of license termination
to renegotiate the license to grant it those rents from the product that
otherwise would have gone to the licensee. In this situation, the firm
may be most valuable unacquired.
92 At present, managers often draft change of control provisions as narrowly as
possible so that many do not cover all corporate combinations a hostile raider might
seek to implement. Should courts implement a strong shareholder choice regime that
precludes the use of targeted defenses, managers can be expected to implement
broader change of control provisions that deter acquisitions.
9' Indeed, even without a change of control provision, many licenses are pre-
sumed to terminate in the event of a merger where the acquirer is the surviving firm.
See Elaine D. Ziff, The Effect of Corporate Acquisitions on the Target Company's License Rights,
57 Bus. LAw. 767, 783-87 (2002) (discussing the termination of trademark and patent
licenses in the context of forward mergers).
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Second, third-party beneficiaries of a change of control provision
also can be relied upon to terminate the contract when the third party
competes with the firm's potential acquirers. Indeed, examples exist
currently where such provisions have impacted takeovers.
For example, John Labatt Ltd., Canada's second largest beer
manufacturer, apparently fended off a hostile offer by Onex Corp., in
part through the use of partially disclosed third-party contracts and
licenses terminable upon a change of control for Labatt. These third-
party agreements included the Canadian Budweiser license and the
license for the Mexican brewer, FEMSA Cerveza SA 9
At one point, efforts to acquire Hershey Foods Co. (Hershey)
were hindered in part by a change of control provision in Hershey's
license from Nestl6 SA, granting it the right to manufacture and sell
KitKat, one of the most popular chocolate bars in the world. Nestle
has looked unfavorably on attempts to acquire Hershey, which could
improve Hershey's competitive position and at one point threatened
to terminate its license in the event Hershey experiences a change of
control. 6
Finally, certain managers (for example, founding shareholders)
can use their own licensing agreements with the firm to grant them
94 Likewise, companies can use joint ventures with other firms in the same industry
that terminate upon a change of control to impede acquisitions by other firms in the
industry. Parties to a joint venture also can deter bids by including noncompete
agreements in the venture, which would prohibit either the company or an affiliate
from competing without termination of the respective company's rights under the ven-
ture. Such provisions can be used to deter acquisition of the firm by companies in the
same industry as the venture.
95 Larry M. Greenberg, Onex Pressures Labatt to Disclose Third-Party Pacts, WALL ST.J.,
May 25, 1995, at C15.
96 See Gordon Fairclough & Erin White, Shake-Up in Candyland, WALL ST.J.,July 26,
2002, at B1 (describing the Nestl6 deal). The Nestl6 deal is not the only impediment
to the sale of Hershey. The sale also has been impeded by the political objectives of
Hershey Trust Company, the major Hershey shareholder. See Robert Frank & Sarah
Ellison, Meltdown in Chocolatetown, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2002, at BI (describing the
Hershey Trust Company's rejection of a sale of Hershey in response to public pres-
sure).
Of course, existing change of control termination clauses in contracts with com-
petitors do not always deter acquisitions. Yet, those acquisitions that proceed in the
face of existing change of control provisions do not undercut our claim that such pro-
visions could be used defensively. At present, managers do not try to maximize the
defensive effect of change of control provisions because they have superior, lower-cost
defenses available to them. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71 (arguing that
managers have little reason to employ pre-bid embedded defenses because they can
employ lower-cost pure defenses). Under shareholder choice, managers would alter
these provisions.
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effective control over any acquisition. For example, rather than grant
valuable intellectual property to the firm outright, a founding
shareholder can license the property to the firm with a contract that
provides for termination of the license upon change of control.
Donna Karan International is an example of a firm that has employed
this type of defensive measure.9 7 When the company went public
in 1996, Ms. Karan and her husband retained control of the trade-
marks for most of the product lines-including "Donna Karan,"
"Donna Karan New York," "DKNY," and "DK"W-under a wholly owned
corporation, Gabrielle Studio.9 Gabrielle Studio then licensed the
trademarks to Donna Karan Corporation, with a provision terminating
the license in the event of a change of control of Donna Karan Corp.9
The employee contract with Donna Karan also terminates upon
change of control. This grants her effective authority to determine
whether the firm is sold, and to whom, because most of the firm's
goodwill would evaporate upon any change of control done absent
Ms. Karan's explicit consent. 1°
b. Penalty provisions
Managers need not restrict themselves to change of control provi-
sions that simply terminate the contract. In addition, they can obtain
protection from acquisitions by employing change of control provi-
sions that require the firm to confer substantial benefits to the third
party in the event of a change of control: clauses we refer to as "pen-
alty" change of control provisions. If large enough, these penalties
can substantially insulate managers from acquisitions.
Penalty change of control provisions serve legitimate purposes in
certain situations and, thus, should not be prohibited categorically.
Penalty provisions may improve the joint welfare of contracting parties
when third parties can expect to suffer losses in the event of a change
of control of a contracting party even if the contract is terminated.
Third parties may be injured by a change of control even if they
terminate the contract when acquirers can use the information the
target gained from contracting with the third party to compete against
97 Donna Karan International Prospectus, supra note 85, at 76.
98 Id.
99 See id. (defining change of control as the purchase by a third party of thirty per-
cent of the stock of Donna Karan International); see also Wendy Bounds, Donna Karan
International's Slip is Beginning to Show, WALL ST.J., May 8, 1997, at BI (describing Ms.
Karan's licensing agreement and its implications).
100 Donna Karan International Prospectus, supra note 85, at 76.
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the third party. In such cases, third parties may legitimately insist on
being paid additional remuneration upon a change of control in or-
der to protect their interests.
Third parties also may insist on penalty provisions where terminat-
ing the contract is likely to be the optimal response to a change of
control, and yet would leave the third party worse off than if no
change of control occurred. Accordingly, to protect themselves from
substantial potential costs associated with a change of control, third
parties may reasonably insist on change of control provisions that give
them the right to terminate the contract on favorable terms: terms
that confer a benefit on the third party and a penalty on the contract-
ing firm.10'
At present, firms incorporate penalty change of control provisions
into a variety of contracts, including debt contracts, leases, licenses,
union agreements, and joint ventures. Although many existing pen-
alty change of control provisions are value enhancing, managers sub-
ject to shareholder choice could readily employ such provisions de-
fensively, at shareholders' expense. An examination of existing
penalty change of control provisions reveals their potential as defen-
sive measures should managers ever need to exploit them more ag-
gressively than they do at present.102
Firms currently employ penalty change of control provisions in
basic financing arrangements, such as debt contracts. For example,
non-investment-grade debt contracts often contain change of control
provisions that give the creditor the right to transfer her bonds back
to the issuer at a premium upon a change of control. By incorporat-
ing such penalties into all debt contracts, managers could employ
these and other similar provisions to substantially increase the costs of
acquisitions. Indeed, in previous periods, managers have used penalty
103change of control provisions in debt covenants to deter acquisitions.
101 Notwithstanding the general judicial disfavor of contractual penalties, courts
generally enforce these penalty change of control terms. First, the plausible third-
party losses that attend a change of control usually consist of lost profit streams that
are extremely difficult to quantify, thereby substantially increasing the chances that the
stipulated term will be enforceable. Second, these terms often are drafted to hide the
penalty provision. For example, the penalty clauses in joint venture agreements often
simply state the price at which the third party can purchase the joint venture, without
specifying the degree to which this price is below the fair market value of the venture.
102 Indeed, the poison pill is one form of penalty change of control provisions.
Should courts preclude managers from using the pill, managers could incorporate
penalty provisions of a similar magnitude into other contracts, such as debt contracts.
103 Analysis of bond covenants reveals that managers have altered the structure of
these covenants over time to operate more or less as entrenchment devices depending
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Managers also can, and do, incorporate penalty change of control
provisions into joint venture agreements. Joint venture agreements
often contain change of control provisions that grant to one party the
right to buy the other's interest in the venture upon a change of
control by the latter; these provisions can operate as penalty provi-
sions by setting a buyout price that is less than fair market value. In
this case, a change of control of the target can result in the target los-
ing a substantial portion of the value of the joint venture upon a
change of control. If the joint venture is profitable enough and the
penalty large enough, these provisions can deter an acquirer. The
penalty also reduces the value to target shareholders of any deals that
do proceed.
The joint venture between Schering-Plough Corp. and Merck &
Co. appears to contain such a penalty change of control provision. In
the shadow of speculation that it was ripe for a hostile bid, Schering-
Plough entered into a joint venture with Merck to cooperate in the
development and marketing of a new anticholesterol drug, Zetia, a
drug many concluded was Schering-Plough's best hope for future
profits.' 4 The agreement provides that, if a third company bought
Schering-Plough, Merck could purchase Schering-Plough's interest in
the joint venture at an unspecified price, which could not equal the
actual value of the venture. °5 Given that Zetia appeared to be Scher-
ing-Plough's best hope for future profits, the joint venture agreement
effectively discouraged bids.1
6
Similarly, the joint venture between Wackenhut Corrections Corp.
and Serco Investments Ltd. grants Serco the right to buy out Wacken-
hut's interest in the joint venture for less than its fair market value in
in part on the availability of alternative defenses. For example, almost all of the bonds
issued prior to the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout contained terms that encumbered
only hostile takeovers and proxy contests. These terms helped entrench managers,
while providing little real protection to bondholders. Kahan & Klausner, supra note
65, at 970-72. Managers moved away from entrenchment-oriented debt covenants after
they embraced the poison pill, and with the decline in takeover activity in the early
1990s. See id. at 980.
104 Peter Landers, Merck Sacrificed Right to Make Buyout Offer to Schering-Plough, WALL
ST.J., Oct. 22, 2002, at B3.
105 The price is to be determined after any change of control by two investment
banks without ties to the companies. Id. This raises the cost to an acquirer of bidding
for Schering-Plough because the acquirer cannot easily determine the appropriate
purchase price for Schering-Plough without knowing what value the investment banks
will place on the Schering-Plough/Merckjoint venture.
106 Id.
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the event of a change of control of Wackenhut. 0 7 Other examples
abound. ° s
Managers also can incorporate penalty change of control provi-
sions into licensing agreements. For example, in response to a hostile
offer by Oracle Corp., PeopleSoft, Inc. employed a penalty change of
control provision in its licensing fee agreements with customers. Un-
der this provision, PeopleSoft offered its software licensees a refund of
between two and five times their licensing fees if, within four years of a
change of control, the acquirer reduced investment in research and
development and customer support.'°9 The resulting penalty of $800
million (by current estimates) is sufficiently large that Oracle an-
nounced that it could not proceed with its bid if PeopleSoft continued
to offer such refunds.10° While the specific provision in PeopleSoft
107 See Robin Londner, Latest News, Wackenhut Corrections to Sell UK. Venture, S. FLA.
Bus. J., May 8, 2003, at http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2003/05/
05/daily56.html (mentioning the dispute between Wackenhut and Serco concerning
Serco's right to buy Wackenhut's joint venture interest).
Penalty joint venture clauses also impacted Guinness's merger with GrandMet. A
third party, Mo~t Hennessy-Louis Vuitton (LVMH) claimed that the merger triggered
change of control clauses in its joint ventures with Guinness. Alasdair Murray, LVMH
Move Threatens £23bn Guinness Merger, TIMES (London), May 29, 1997, at 25. These
change of control provisions allowed LVMH to buy back Guinness's stake in its seven-
teen joint ventures at asset value in the event Guinness experienced a change of con-
trol; they also entitled LVMH to buy Guinness's thirty-four percent stake in Mooat
Hennessy at a discount of up to fifteen percent. Id. In return for a payment from
Guinness of 250 million pounds, LVMH eventually agreed to withdraw its effort to
block the merger. Major Obstacle Cleared in (pounds) 24bn Guinness Deal, IRISH TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1997, at 18. Had LVMH pursued its claim in arbitration, the firm stood to
gain as much as one billion pounds had it prevailed. Id.
'08 There are many examples of penalty change of control provisions embedded
within joint venture agreements. For example, Pacific Dunlop (PacDun) included a
change of control provision in its South Pacific Tyres joint venture with the Goodyear
group that granted each partner the right to buy out the other in the event of a
change of control. Under the sale price formula to be employed, Goodyear would
need to pay PacDun only about half the value of PacDun's share of the joint venture
should PacDun be subject to a change of control. Malcolm Maiden, PacDun: Deliver or
Else, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 30, 1999, at 97. Another example is WMC Ltd.,
an Australian mining company with aluminum assets, which created an impediment to
any effort to sell the firm by inserting a change of control provision in its joint venture
with Alcoa World Alumina and Chemicals (AWAC). The joint venture agreement re-
quired any acquirer with aluminum assets who took control of WMC to insert its alu-
minum assets into the AWAC joint venture. As a result of this agreement, when the
WMC board decided to solicit an acquisition, it determined that it would need to split
WMC in two in order to sell to anyone other than AWAC. Kate Askew, PM and Mrs.
Lob AtJonesy's Chrissy Do, SYDNEYMORNING HERALD, Dec. 13, 2001, at 25.
109 David Bank, Oracle May Drop Bid for PeopleSoft Over Refund Offer, WALL ST. J., Nov.
11, 2003, at B4.
110 Id.; Chris O'Brien, PeopleSoft Alters its Rebate Program, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
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may be vulnerable to court challenge in part because it was adopted
post-bid, managers seeking to deter hostile offers could adopt similar
provisions in the ordinary course of business. Such actions would al-
most certainly be entitled to business judgment rule protection, since
such customer protection provisions in customer service agreements
arguably enhance firm value by guaranteeing the long-term quality of
the product. "'
2. Change of Control Provisions Under Shareholder Choice
Accordingly, were courts to embrace a strong form of shareholder
choice-regulating all post-bid and targeted defenses-managers
could entrench themselves nonetheless by making much greater use
of penalty change of control provisions. Moreover, managers could
increase the deterrent effect of these provisions by employing large
penalties-justifying the higher penalties through the greater need to
protect third parties from the increased risk of tender offers under
shareholder choice. Managers could further strengthen the en-
trenchment effect of these measures by inserting them into many
separate types of contracts, including debt contracts, customer agree-
ments, employment agreements, licenses, and joint ventures. Insert-
ing change of control provisions in a variety of contracts could in-
crease both the magnitude of, and the uncertainty surrounding, the
total penalty resulting from a change of control. A firm employing
penalty change of control provisions in a variety of nonmaterial con-
tracts could increase bidder uncertainty by publicizing that such pro-
visions exist, while refusing to disclose their precise value.
1 2
Nov. 20, 2003, at 3C (describing how potential liability for refunds has risen to $800
million).
I Id. Among Oracle's original claims were that the PeopleSoft provisions are in-
valid because they potentially impose a change of control penalty on PeopleSoft even
upon a change of control of the PeopleSoft board if it is not supported by the existing
board. This aspect of the provision arguably infringes on shareholders' franchise. On
November 17, however, PeopleSoft retracted the provision treating a change in the
board as a "change of control," describing the original decision to adopt such a broad
provision as an "administrative error." Mark Veverka, PeopleSoft: A Wolf in Sheep's Cloth-
ing, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 24, 2003, at D4. Whatever the eventual fate of PeopleSoft's
revised licensing agreement, managers could no doubt implement similar change of
control provisions in the ordinary course of business that are effective and yet avoid
any problems the courts may find with the PeopleSoft provisions.
..2 The board need not disclose the terms of immaterial contracts. Managers thus
can create impediments to hostile bidders by including change of control provisions in
each of their non-material third-party contracts, and disclose the existence of such
provisions but not their terms. Managers could thereby entrench themselves by using
20031
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Penalty provisions are effective in part because they are relatively
resistant to Coasean renegotiation: the acquirer would necessarily
have to involve a third party, providing her with sufficient compensa-
tion to offset her foregone opportunity to receive the penalty. This, in
and of itself, would increase acquirers' costs. Moreover, acquirers may
be unable to renegotiate penalty change of control provisions if firms
employ such provisions in many contracts, or in contracts involving
numerous parties (such as debt securities)."3 In such situations, rene-
gotiation may be prohibitively expensive in terms of the time, effort,
and collective action problems that often attend multi-party bargain-
ing when each party has an incentive to hold out for a disproportion-
ate share of the joint gains.14 Finally, managers can further impede
bargaining by inserting such provisions in contracts with parties who
could be hurt by the acquisition (e.g., creditors, employees, or com-
petitors).
Managers would enjoy considerable discretion to expand their use
of change of control provisions because neither courts nor sharehold-
ers can confidently regulate them. Courts cannot simply invalidate all
penalty change of control clauses because many are used to enable
the firm to enter into value-enhancing contracts by protecting legiti-
mate interests of contracting parties. 115 Courts, therefore, could not
prohibit such measures categorically absent clear proof that the bene-
fits of legitimate change of control provisions are dwarfed by the cost
of permitting firms to use these provisions defensively. The existing
evidence on the widespread use of such provisions suggests courts
should be wary of reaching such a conclusion. The use of such provi-
sions, notwithstanding management's access to low-cost defenses such
the combined effect of these provisions to increase both the potential costs of acquir-
ing the firm and potential bidders' uncertainty about the value of the target. Cf Edlin
& Stiglitz, supra note 86, at 1302 (discussing how managers can entrench themselves
using measures that increase acquirers uncertainty concerning firm value).
"' For example, poison pills are themselves penalty change of control provisions.
We are not aware of any bidder attempting to circumvent a pill by negotiating with all
shareholders for them to relinquish their rights under the pill in return for the ac-
quirer proceeding with the bid.
114 See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONoMics 81-90 (3d
ed. 2000) (describing transaction costs presented by multi-party bargaining).
"5 See supra text accompanying notes 91-92 and notes 100-01 (discussing the bene-
fit of change of control provisions in third-party agreements); see, e.g., Kahan & Klaus-
ner, supra note 65, at 93740 (discussing how change of control provisions in bonds can
benefit the firm).
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as the poison pill and classified boards, lends credence to the claim
that these provisions serve legitimate goals."
6
Nor can courts prohibit only value-reducing change of control
provisions. Courts cannot reliably distinguish legitimate, value-
enhancing change of control provisions from value-reducing provi-
sions that serve primarily entrenchment aims." 7 Thus, courts cannot
effectively regulate these measures either ex ante or ex post after a bid
has been announced."" Nor can courts prevent the use of value-
reducing pre-bid change of control provisions by insisting that share-
holders consent to such contracts. As noted above, shareholders are
not sufficiently informed to oversee the terms of ordinary business
transactions reliably, a proposition proponents of shareholder choice
themselves readily concede." 9 Indeed, evaluating change of control
16 For a possible explanation of why managers might not employ optimal takeover
defenses, see John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001).
"' Although it might appear that courts can identify entrenchment provisions
based on whether the provision was proposed by management or a third party, this is
not the case. A manager may propose a value-enhancing change of control provision if
she concludes that she can obtain a better agreement as a result. In addition, at
present third parties regularly seek such provisions; what determines whether the
agreement contains such a provision is whether third parties meet resistance from
managers. Managers, thus, could increase their use of penalty change of control pro-
visions simply by acceding to third parties' requests for them.
" Ex post scrutiny by courts or shareholders would undermine the value of many
of these arrangements by leaving their validity uncertain. This would reduce the value
of those firms that benefit from adopting such measures.
Thus, arguments favoring court oversight of redeemable poison pills do not apply
to their cousins, change of control provisions. Penalty change of control provisions are
less amendable to shareholder oversight than are redeemable poison pills. In theory,
courts can retain any benefits of poison pills, while muting their adverse effects, by re-
quiring boards to submit all bids to the shareholders for a vote and redeem any pill
affecting a shareholder-approved acquisition. By contrast, courts cannot use share-
holder voting to undo the entrenchment effect of change of control provisions without
also eliminating the benefits of these provisions because change of control provisions
generally impose costs on the target firm in the event of a change of control, even if
shareholders approve the deal. Courts, therefore, cannot remove the entrenchment
effect of these provisions by invalidating penalties whenever shareholders approve the
deal, because third parties seek protection from shareholder-approved deals. Thus, ex
post invalidation would hinder firms' abilities to employ these provisions when they are
value enhancing.
"' Corporate scholars have suggested that ordinary shareholders may not have
sufficient incentive and capacity to make even the simplest decisions associated with
shark repellent amendments. Further, these scholars argue that sophisticated share-
holders may not intervene aggressively if they expect it to be too expensive to inform
unsophisticated investors. See Gilson, supra note 22, at 822-27 (claiming that share-
holders approve shark repellent amendments contrary to their own self-interest
2003]
626 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW
provisions would challenge the capacity of both ordinary and sophisti-
cated shareholders120 because the nature and effects of these
provisions are firm-specific-and even contract-specific. Thus, analy-
sis of any one provision would not necessarily enable shareholders to
assess any other, even when adopted by the same firm.
Accordingly, managers subject to a shareholder choice regime
that regulates all targeted defenses could entrench themselves by us-
ing blanket pre-bid embedded defenses, such as penalty change of
control provisions. 2 1 Increased use of such defenses could adversely
affect the number of acquisitions, friendly and hostile alike. As the
vast majority of deals currently are friendly acquisitions, any legal re-
form that might deter such acquisitions could reduce the welfare of
target shareholders.
D. Pre-Bid Measures Granting Managers Private Benefits
Managers can employ pre-bid measures not only to deter potential
acquisitions, but also to guarantee that they obtain substantial private
benefits from any acquisitions that do occur. Managers can guarantee
themselves substantial private benefits from acquisitions through
because unsophisticated shareholders are not adequately informed and sophisticated
shareholders find it too costly to intervene to inform unsophisticated shareholders).
"0 Institutional shareholders have evinced a preference for analyzing corporate
governance issues common to many firms, instead of measures (such as change of con-
trol provisions) whose effects are corporation-specific.
Shareholders' inability to exercise ex ante oversight over change of control provi-
sions also implies that shareholders could not effectively use the threat of a proxy con-
test to deter managers from implementing value-reducing change of control provi-
sions. Shareholders cannot be relied on to dislodge managers who have adopted
value-reducing change of control provisions if they cannot determine which change of
control provisions are, in fact, value reducing. See supra Part I.D.2 and note 67 (dis-
cussing why shareholders cannot rely on proxy contests to optimally deter managers'
use of these defensive measures).
Moreover, even if shareholders were sure that managers had adopted a value-
reducing change of control provision, they might be unwilling to respond by mounting
a proxy contest to replace management. First, depending on how the change of con-
trol provisions are written, a successful proxy contest itself may trigger the change of
control provision. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 65, at 937-43 (describing debt
covenants with this feature). Second, shareholders may have little to gain from such a
proxy contest since blanket change of control provisions generally are not redeemable
by the board. Thus, shareholders of firms with strong change of control provisions
may not be able to make the firm more takeover-friendly by changing management.
Thus, management's adoption of such provisions will not necessarily provide share-
holders with an incentive to replace management. See supra note 67.
1 Indeed, the poison pill itself is an example of a substitute defense invented to
circumvent efforts to regulate prior defenses, such as selective self-tenders.
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the use of change of control provisions in executive compensation
agreements (e.g., golden parachutes). Typical executive compensa-
tion arrangements provide that on a change of control, senior man-
agement receives severance pay equal to three years salary, bonuses,
and options. 122 In addition, the change of control often triggers the
vesting of the executives' stock options. Managers can use these
severance packages to guarantee themselves substantial private bene-
fits in the event of a change of control.
While in theory these packages could become sufficiently large
enough to deter deals,123 the more significant problem is that manag-
ers can employ these arrangements to grant themselves a dispropor-
tionate share of the gains from an acquisition-the very gains propo-
nents of shareholder choice seek to wrest from them. 2 4  Under
shareholder choice, executives facing a greater risk of termination
could legitimately insist on larger severance packages. This would en-
able them to appropriate a larger share of the gains from tender of-
fers. 1 Moreover, large severance packages would substantially reduce
the disciplining effect of a tender offer for management. Cushioned
by golden parachutes, managers might feel considerable latitude to
122 The cost of these payments may be greater than other executive compensation
if the cash amount exceeds Internal Revenue Services limitations on cash compensa-
tion, resulting in the firm being unable to deduct these amounts. See Nomad Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. Damon Corp., Nos. 10173, 10189, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133, *1718 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 20, 1988) ("[A] corporation will be denied a tax deduction for a sizable por-
tion of any golden parachute payment where the payment exceeds three times the
employee's annual average compensation.").
23 In theory, managers also could use severance packages to deter acquisitions.
While, currently, executive severance packages are not sufficiently large enough to de-
ter deals, there is little reason to believe the structure of such plans would remain fixed
following implementation of shareholder choice. Managers could use these packages
to raise significantly the cost of a tender offer. Managers also could increase bidders'
costs through the grant of executive stock options and Employee Stock Option Plans
with long vesting periods containing change of control provisions that accelerate vest-
ing upon change of control. This imposes significant additional costs on acquirers,
who must buy out all these additional shares at the bid price. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin
J. Murphy, The Trouble With Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49, 50, 52 (2003)
(explaining that option plans, including ESOPs, often grant stock options to employ-
ees and executives with vesting periods that may be as long as four years, but contain
change of control provisions that accelerate the vesting of these stock options upon a
change of control).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 134-35 and Part IV.D (explaining why share-
holder choice may reduce shareholders' welfare even if shareholders employ incentive
compensation to deter managers from adopting pre-bid embedded defenses).
125 Courts would likely invalidate compensation that is completely unreasonable.
Yet managers subject to shareholder choice would have a strong claim to needing lar-
ger golden parachutes to compensate them for the greater risk of a hostile deal.
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pursue private benefits, viewing an acquisition as an opportunity to
accelerate their opportunity to reap considerable private gains.
III. THE INCENTIVE TO EMPLOY EMBEDDED DEFENSES
The preceding discussion illustrates the wide variety of pre-bid
embedded arrangements that could be used to thwart tender offers if
other defenses from Table 1 were unavailable. Moreover, should
courts regulate the most targeted of these arrangements, managers
could simply turn to less targeted means, such as blanket change of
control provisions. These unregulable defenses could be far more
costly to shareholders than existing pure defenses, as they would deter
both friendly and hostile deals.'
2 6
The possibility of managerial substitution into blanket pre-bid
embedded defenses presents a serious challenge to proponents of
shareholder choice, because it reveals that regulation of all targeted
defenses could make shareholders worse off by inducing substitution
into defenses that impose greater costs on the firm. 27 The degree to
which such substitution undermines the case for shareholder choice,
however, turns on whether managers actually would resort to untar-
geted defenses. After all, defenses that deter all acquisitions hurt
managers as well as shareholders. Accordingly, our argument turns
centrally on whether there exists a credible threat that managers, un-
able to retain control over hostile acquisitions, would instead employ
blanket embedded defenses, notwithstanding any chilling effects on• •• 128
friendly acquisitions.
This Section evaluates whether managers can indeed be expected
to employ untargeted embedded defenses at the pre-bid stage if sub-
ject to a strong shareholder choice regime. In order to examine this
issue, we consider the strongest version of shareholder choice under
which courts prevent managers from exerting any post-bid control
126 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing why such defenses are unregulable); see also su-
pra Part I.D.1 (discussing unregulability of pre-bid embedded defenses).
127 To grant shareholders control over tender offers, courts would need to regulate
all targeted defenses, and not just some of them such as those imposed post-bid, be-
cause otherwise managers could simply employ alternative, unregulated, targeted de-
fenses (such as "hostile trigger" penalty change of control debt covenants) to retain
control over tender offers. See infra Part V.A (discussing the problems with intermedi-
ate shareholder choice regimes). Whether regulating all targeted defenses promotes
shareholder welfare, however, turns on whether managers would respond by adopting
unregulable blanket embedded defenses.
128 See Gilson, supra note 22, at 887-90 (arguing that managers will not adopt blan-
ket pre-bid defenses because these defenses are too costly to managers).
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over tender offers by prohibiting the use of pure, post-bid, and tar-
geted pre-bid embedded defenses. In other words, we consider a re-
gime under which managers are limited to blanket defenses (in the
fourth quadrant of Table 1)-specifically, pre-bid blanket embedded
defenses-that operate prior to any bid, by deterring acquisitions
generally. 2 9 Within this setting we examine whether managers would
be willing to adopt these defenses, even at the obvious cost to them-. 130
selves of decreasing the probability of a friendly deal. Relatedly, we
examine whether managers would be willing to employ such nontar-
geted defenses even at the cost of reducing value from the sharehold-
• 131
ers' perspective.
A. The Costs and Benefits to Managers of Blanket Defenses
Perhaps the best way to understand the credibility issue is to com-
pare managers' incentives under a shareholder choice regime (as de-
fined above) with those under a managerial choice regime that per-
mits managers either to preclude all unwanted hostile bids or to steer
acquisitions toward friendly deals that compensate managers for
' This version of shareholder choice is the most important to analyze because,
under a weaker shareholder choice regime that permits some targeted defenses (which
systematically deter only hostile bids), managers would surely opt to employ those de-
fenses, thereby rendering the legal regime ineffectual at little additional cost to the
firm or the manager. Yet, the wisdom of attempting to regulate all post-bid and
targeted defenses depends on whether this would induce managers to employ blanket
defenses.
"' This version of shareholder choice is consistent with the proposal of Lucian
Bebchuk, who argues in favor of requiring boards to submit all tender offers to share-
holders for a vote and forbidding boards from implementing any post-bid defensive
measures without shareholder approval. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 975-76 (arguing
against board veto power and for undistorted shareholder choice). We analyze a re-
gime that surpasses his proposal by excluding all targeted defenses because existing
shareholder choice proposals lose much of their normative punch if managers could
easily retain control through targeted pre-bid embedded defenses. See supra Part lI.B
(discussing substitute targeted defenses); infta Part V.A (discussing intermediate
shareholder choice regimes).
Nevertheless, while we presume provisionally that courts could prohibit all tar-
geted pre-bid embedded defenses, we expect that courts in fact would be unable to
preclude managers from retaining control over tender offers post-bid, for the reasons
given in Part II.B. In this instance, a shareholder choice regime would do little more
than replace one type of targeted defense with another, with no resulting increase in
shareholder control over tender offers.
"' Many of these pre-bid embedded defenses may themselves be value enhancing.
Thus, the critical issue for evaluating managerial responses to shareholder choice is
not to ask whether managers would ever adopt pre-bid embedded defenses (since
many would anyway), but rather whether managers might do so in instances where
they make shareholders worse off.
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private benefits. The credibility of the threat that a manager may im-
plement value-reducing blanket embedded defenses depends on
whether expected gain to managers of employing such a defense ex-
ceeds the expected costs, given the alternative defenses available to
managers and the expected costs (or benefits) to managers of acquisi-
tions. Managers benefit from the use of blanket defenses to the ex-
tent that these defenses protect managers' private benefits by deter-
ring hostile acquisitions that managers could not otherwise deter
through alternative, more targeted, defenses.
3 2
Yet blanket embedded defenses also impose potential costs on
managers. First, some blanket defenses reduce firm value for reasons
other than their effect on acquisitions. This hurts managers to the ex-
tent that their welfare depends on the firm's profits. Second, and
generally more significantly, blanket defenses may reduce managerial
welfare by deterring friendly deals as well as hostile ones.1 33 Managers
are loath to deter friendly deals to the extent they expect to receive
them because acquirers often grant managers private benefits in the
course of these transactions. In addition, managers benefit from such
acquisitions in their capacity as shareholders.
Accordingly, managers' incentives to employ blanket defenses de-
pends on whether the benefit they reap by using blanket defenses to
deter hostile deals outweighs the cost they incur by deterring friendly
ones. As shall be shown, this depends on the nature of the legal re-
gime governing shareholder choice. It also depends, of course, on
the extent to which shareholders respond to the threat by altering the
manager's compensation package.
B. Managers'Incentives Under Managerial Choice
Under a managerial choice rule, managers have no reason to
adopt value-reducing blanket defenses that deter hostile and friendly
deals alike because they can employ targeted defenses both to deter
hostile deals and to channel would-be acquirers toward manager-
friendly acquisitions. As such friendly overtures typically compensate
managers for their foregone private benefit of control, managers
3' The benefit to managers of deterring hostile deals depends on the magnitude
of managers' private benefits (net of any foregone gains managers would obtain from
selling their shares in a hostile acquisition). It also depends on the probability that
managers could deter the hostile acquisition through other, more targeted, means.
"' We define a hostile acquisition as one that does not grant managers substantial
private benefits.
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protected by a managerial veto rule have a strict preference for allow-
ing as many friendly offers as possible. Consequently, if given a choice
between a broad defense that would deter all forms of acquisition and
a targeted defense that would deter only hostile bids, managers would
strongly prefer the latter. Thus, all else held constant, they would es-
chew blanket defenses.
C. Managers' Incentives Under Shareholder Choice
A strong shareholder choice regime would fundamentally alter
managers' incentives to employ blanket defenses, increasing the stra-
tegic benefit of such measures while simultaneously reducing their
cost. Under such a regime, managers would be much more willing to
adopt blanket pre-bid defenses, even if these blanket defense ap-
proaches were inefficient for the firm.3
Under an effective shareholder choice regime that precludes all
targeted defenses, managers would obtain considerable benefit from
blanket defenses because these defenses would be managers' only way
to deter hostile acquisitions that threaten managers' private benefit of'
control. As shareholder choice also increases the relative attractive-
ness of hostile offers for undefended firms, the benefit to managers of
employing an embedded defense grows accordingly.
Shareholder choice not only would increase the benefit managers
reap from blanket defenses, it also would reduce the cost they incur
from reducing friendly deals. While managers are loathe to deter
friendly deals that confer substantial private benefits, managers would
not expect to receive such offers under an effective shareholder
choice regime. Indeed, because such a regime grants shareholders
control over the fate of competing offers, acquirers would compete to
curry the favor of shareholders alone, not the board, Consequently,
acquirers would pay all the gains to shareholders instead of conferring
substantial private benefits on management. Thus, from manage-
ment's perspective, most proposed acquisitions would operate like
hostile offers, in that they would not ensure managers obtain compen-
sation for their private benefits.
Accordingly, shareholder choice would weaken the central exist-
ing impediment to managers' use of blanket defenses: their desire to
obtain private benefits through potential friendly acquisitions. With
much to gain from deterring hostile deals and little to lose from
' The next Part presents a formal analysis of managers' incentives under share-
holder choice. See infra Part IV.
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deterring friendly acquisitions, managers would have a significantly
greater incentive to employ value-reducing blanket defenses. More-
over, managers' incentives to deter hostile acquisitions would be
greater than at present because, absent defenses, the risk of a hostile
bid would be substantially increased by the adoption of shareholder
choice.
Accordingly, once managers' up-front incentives are accounted
for, informed shareholder choice need not enhance shareholder wel-
fare. While shareholder choice would increase the probability that
any tender offer that is made succeeds, it may reduce shareholder wel-
fare by (1) reducing the total number of acquisitions attempted,
and/or (2) the amount that acquirers would be willing to pay even in
successful acquisitions.
Contributing to this problem is the fact that shareholders would
find it difficult to avoid the negative repercussions of shareholder
choice by simply increasing managers' incentive pay in order to deter
them from selecting embedded defenses. Shareholders potentially
could try to deter managers from adopting blanket defenses by grant-
ing managers a sufficient stake in the firm that they benefit from hos-
tile bids. Yet this would not enable shareholders to avoid the cost of
the substitution effect because to deter untargeted defenses, share-
holders may need to grant managers such a large stake in the firm
that shareholders gain less from the firm than they would under
managerial choice.1 35 Thus, far from eliminating the "substitution
cost" of shareholder choice, incentive compensation would just alter
when and how shareholders bear it, potentially resulting in lower
shareholder welfare than is available under managerial choice.
36
See infra Part IV.D (demonstrating the conditions where this occurs). Share-
holders also would appear to have other means of regulating managers, for example,
the proxy contest. Yet proxy contests may not be an effective mechanism for deterring
the use of blanket embedded defenses because shareholders of firms with such de-
fenses may gain little from replacing existing management. Supra note 67. Consistent
with this, there is little evidence that non-acquirer shareholders' attempt to regulate
managers' use of existing defenses by mounting proxy contests, outside of proxy con-
tests associated with takeovers. Shareholders would be particularly unlikely to use the
proxy contest to punish managers for adopting pre-bid embedded blanket defenses
because shareholders generally cannot determine whether the defense was value re-
ducing when adopted. and they cannot remove the defense by changing the composi-
tion of the board. See supra notes 67, 118 (discussing the limitations of proxy contests).
136 Our analysis compares a strong shareholder choice regime to a managerial
choice regime that permits managers to "just say no" to unwanted hostile acquisitions.
This managerial choice regime is similar to that prevailing under existing Delaware
law. We find that this form of managerial choice regime may be superior to a strong
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IV. FORMAL ANALYSIS
The preceding sections of this Article have concentrated on the
institutional setting that frames our central argument, and the under-
lying intuition of that argument. In this Part, we demonstrate more
formally our claim that a shareholder choice regime may induce man-
agers to implement pre-bid blanket embedded defenses that impose
greater costs on the firm than targeted defenses by deterring both
hostile and friendly deals. To focus our inquiry, we will analyze a styl-
ized, theoretical model of firm management in a takeover setting. As
with any model, our analysis presents a simplified portrait of the
world, but one that reflects certain core characteristics of the acquisi-
tions context that are critical for evaluating competing legal regimes.
Specifically, the analytical framework we explore below captures at
least five characteristics of the takeover market that-given our discus-
sion above-appear to be the most salient. First, we presume that
managers of corporations are motivated principally by self interest. In
particular, managers derive private benefits from their positions of
control, which in turn provide them with a strong incentive either to
preserve their positions (in the case of a hostile bid) or to demand
compensation from an acquirer (in the case of a friendly bid).
Second, we presume that an active market for corporate control
exists, so that some component of firm value comes from the prospect
of a future takeover (hostile or friendly). Indeed, as we demonstrate
below, the legal treatment of shareholder choice only "matters" when
such a market exists.
Third, we presume that shareholders are sufficiently sophisticated
and coordinated to evaluate business decisions (such as whether to
shareholder choice regime that precludes managers from exerting authority over
which tender offers succeed.
Our conclusion that this form of managerial choice may be superior to a strong
shareholder choice regime does not imply, however, that shareholder welfare would be
higher under an even stronger managerial choice regime. Indeed, we expect quite the
contrary: granting managers additional protections beyond the ability to employ pure
defenses could be welfare reducing. Accordingly, the results of our analysis are not
inconsistent with empirical evidence that, all else equal, Delaware firms are more valu-
able than are firms incorporated in states with even stronger antitakeover laws than
Delaware. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON.
525, 546-47 (2001) (finding that firms incorporated in states with severe antitakeover
statutes have lower value than those incorporated in Delaware).
In a subsequent part we suggest that a hybrid regime that forces managers to sub-
mit some (but not all) deals to shareholders for approval may be superior to both a
strong shareholder choice regime and Delaware's manager choice regime. Infra Part
V.B.
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sell their shares) when a bid emerges. This assumption reflects our
endeavor to interpret shareholder choice proposals in the light most
favorable to their proponents. If shareholders were not sophisticated
in this way, or suffered significant collective action problems, it would
constitute an independent argument against shareholder choice.
Fourth, we suppose that neither shareholders nor courts are suffi-
ciently informed to evaluate decisions made in the ordinary course of
business, and thus cannot assess whether a given pre-bid defense in-
creases or reduces value. This assumption is also consistent with the
shareholder choice literature, which largely concedes the existence of
an unregulable arena of ordinary business activities outside the practi-
cal oversight of shareholders.
Finally, and critically, we suppose that managers subject to a
strong shareholder choice regime can implement pre-bid embedded
defenses that deter bids by reducing the value of the firm in the event
of an acquisition (such as blanket penalty change of control provi-
sions). Such defenses, moreover, need not be in the overall interests
of shareholders of the company.
With these five institutionally informed assumptions in mind, we
now proceed to a description of the framework for our analysis.
A. Framework
Consider a business enterprise (or firm) that exists for two periods
and is-at least initially-owned by a homogenous group of share-
holders. We assume (as noted above) that the firm's shareholders do
not suffer from collective action problems that would disable them
from acting in a coordinated fashion and, thus, can be treated as a
homogenous entity. 
37
We further suppose that the ex post value of the firm has an ele-
ment of risk, which is realized only at the end of the second period.
Explicitly, the value of the firm could be either "high" (and equal to
VH) or "low" (and equal to VL < VH ), with probabilities and values
specified below. The expected value of the firm will generally depend
on both the quality of management and the choices managers make
while controlling the firm.
The shareholders of the firm are unable to manage the firm
themselves, and they therefore hire a liquidity constrained, risk
'37 This assumption enables us to examine shareholder choice in the light most
favorable to its success. If shareholders were subject to large collective action prob-
lems, it would constitute an independent argument in favor of managerial control.
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neutral manager (denoted by M ) to manage the firm. The manager
has an objective underlying quality, which we denote as q, and equate
with the probability that the firm realizes a high value rather than a
low value. This quality characteristic is distributed uniformly between
0 and 1. While not known initially, its true value is realized and
observed by both the shareholders and managers just prior to a bid
being made. 1 8 At this juncture, then, both shareholders and the
incumbent manager will know that the firm's expected gross payoff is
equal to q V/1 +(1-q)VL.
In managing the firm, M is in a position to make an important in-
vestment decision on behalf of the company. In particular, she must
decide between pursuing one of two projects. Project 1 (P1) repre-
sents the "status quo"; an activity that does not materially change the
existing profile of the company. Should the firm pursue this project,
we normalize the firm's realized value to be either V. = 1 or V = 0.
Project 2 (P2), in contrast, represents a pre-bid blanket defense em-
bedded into the firm's other activities. P2 has two effects on the firm,
altering both the firm's expected value under current management
and the probability or terms of a tender offer.' 39
First, P2 affects the firm's expected value by altering the value of
VH. In particular, under P2 the firm's ex post value is either VH = A
or VL = 0. Relative to the status quo, P2 can potentially be either
value increasing or decreasing: thus, A may be any nonnegative num-
ber, and in particular, A could be greater than or less than one. The
expected value of the firm under current management is therefore
equal to q when the firm pursues P1 and equal to A q when the firm
pursues P2. As a benchmark, note that if the possibility of a takeover
138 It is possible to alter this assumption and suppose that shareholders never dis-
cover the manager's quality. But once again, such an assumption would stack the deck
against a shareholder choice regime, as the manager would have strictly better infor-
mation about the merits of an outside tender offer. In addition, it would be possible to
alter the model to allow the manager to know her quality ex ante and have the share-
holders learn it later. In the interest of simplification (and to avoid analysis of a num-
ber of signaling considerations that are not germane to our inquiry), we have opted for
a simpler framework. The same qualitative intuitions would remain in a more compli-
cated model.
1 Note that we have restricted our attention to a choice between two managerial
strategies: the status quo (with, as will become apparent, a targeted defense) and a
pre-bid embedded defense. This clearly simplifies the 2x2 matrix offered in Table 1,
but it does so without any loss of generality, as a similar analysis applies to each of the
sub-choices within Table 1.
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is ignored, the firm's value is maximized when M chooses P2 when-
ever A > 1 and P1 otherwise. 40
Second, P2 affects the firm by altering firm value in the event of a
takeover. In particular, if M selects P1, the status quo, an acquisition
does not itself alter firm value: thus, an acquirer who purchases a
controlling interest in the firm is essentially in the same position as
the manager she displaces. By contrast, under P2, an acquisition
does alter firm value-for example, by triggering a change of control
penalty. Explicitly, a successful acquirer (friendly or hostile) obtains
merely a fraction c of the firm's value upon the successful acquisition
(where c < 1 ). The (1 - c) fraction of the firm's value that the ac-
quirer does not receive represents an extra cost of the acquisition.
In practical terms, P2 could represent any of a variety of actions
that managers can take to drive a wedge between their own costs of
managing the firm and those of an outsider. These include the vari-
ous blanket embedded defenses discussed in the previous Parts that
potentially reduce firm value both before and after an acquisition, in-
cluding preferred stock with change of control penalty puts, third-
party contracts with change of control provisions, managerial con-
tracts with severance clauses, strategic spin-offs, idiosyncratic organiza-
tional structures, and the like. As noted above, some of these actions
might be perfectly justifiable from an organizational perspective in
that they confer sufficiently large benefits to justify their costs (i.e., A
is large relative to c); others, however, have little value and impose
net costs on the firm. Significantly, although the manager can deter-
mine whether P2 is value enhancing in the ex ante period where pro-
ject selection occurs, neither shareholders nor courts can effectively
regulate the manager's project choice (or otherwise regulate the
choice of P2 ).141
In addition to determining the firm's operational profile, we as-
sume that the manager enjoys private benefits from controlling the
firm-a perquisite that comes at the expense of shareholders. Explic-
itly, we suppose that M can divert a fraction of the firm's value, de-
noted by f8, for her personal gain. This diversion is wasteful, how-
ever, in that the manager actually receives only a _2)share of
what she appropriates, which is less than the value of harm visited on
140 Interestingly, as will become clear below, it might also be inefficient to choose
P2 even when A>1 since the adoption of P2 would also deter some future takeovers.
141 In technical terms, then, we assume that project choice is not contractable. See
infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text (elaborating on the strategies and con-
straints on a potential acquirer after M has made a project choice).
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the shareholders. 1 2 Nonmanagerial shareholders can attempt to pro-
vide managers with the incentives not to reduce firm value in this way,
however. Indeed, without such incentives, M chooses to divert the
entire value of the firm.
43
Accordingly, nonmanagerial shareholders compensate M with a
contract that potentially has both a fixed wage component and an in-
centive compensation component. We denote the fixed salary com-
ponent by w. Shareholders also offer M incentive pay, by granting
her a fractional ownership share in the company, denoted by a,
which represents restricted stock, stock options, and so forth. Conse-
quently, once this incentive compensation is paid, the nonmanagerial
shareholders retain only a (1 - a) share of the firm's net value.
To simplify things, we normalize the best payoff that the manager
could get working outside the company to be zero, and assume that
the manager has no existing wealth. This means that the values of w
and a can never be negative (this accords with what we observe in re-
ality).
Finally, in order to compare the takeover effects of a shareholder
choice regime against a managerial choice regime, we introduce a
market for corporate control. In later subsections we also allow a
"' This assumption captures the idea that private benefits may be more than just a
transfer payment-imposing no efficiency losses-but in fact may be value reducing.
This expression can be generalized in many ways without loss of generality. For exam-
ple, a similar setup appears in LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND
THE CHOICE OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS 8-10 (John M. Olin Center
for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 398, 2002), http://www.law.
harvard.edu/ programs/olin .center/papers.htm, where the manager's private benefits
are given by fL- f 2 . The parameter y captures the efficiency with which M can
siphon off value; when y is relatively large, M is an efficient appropriator of value.
Conversely, when y is relatively small, M does not especially benefit from appropriat-
ing value (either because she is not terribly good at it, or because she feels remorse at
doing so, and so forth). Nevertheless, note that the marginal benefit to the manager
of value appropriation is - < I . M is presumed to set f8 after the project type is
selected and any control transactions are decided, but before final realization of the
project's value. We have chosen a simpler equation to represent the manager's private
benefits in order to focus on other conceptual details.
143 To see this, note that the marginal value of taking private benefits is equal to
(1 - fi). This is positive for all 8J<l, and thus without any countervailing incentive,
M will appropriate the whole value of the firm.
The conclusion that managers will divert the entire value of the firm unless
granted incentive compensation (i.e., stock) flows from the fact that we have not for-
mally incorporated any constraints imposed by shareholders' ability to elect new man-
agers. Introducing proxy contests would reduce managers' ability to misappropriate
firm value, but would not affect our ultimate conclusions that shareholder choice in-
creases managers' incentives to employ value-reducing defenses to deter acquisitions.
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third party, denoted by B, to make a bid for the entire corporation.
144
The way in which the firm responds to B 's offer turns on the underly-
ing legal regime, which is the critical point of inquiry in this Article.
Under a "managerial choice" regime, M exercises control over which
bids make it to shareholders, and thus, B's bid must be acceptable to
both managers and shareholders. Under a "shareholder choice" re-
gime, in contrast, M does not exercise such control, and thus, B's
bid need only be acceptable to shareholders. We shall elaborate more
on B 's characteristics and strategies as they become relevant.1
45 Sum-
marizing, then, the sequence of the game is as follows:
Figure 1. Sequence of Decisions
Time >
Legal Regime r~e ihu B makes bid;
Determined: Mslctete accepted subject to
(B) Mgr. P M or P2 applicable legal
Choice regime
(2) SH Choice
M offered M and SHs If no takeover,
compensation observe M's M takes private
package (wv, ) quality ( ]q) benefits (fl)
B. No Market for Corporate Control
As a baseline for later comparisons, it is useful to begin by consid-
ering a special case in which no takeover market exists. In the ab-
sence of a takeover market, P1 and P2 differ only through their ef-
fect on VH, since no acquirer will ever confront the additional costs
imposed by P2. As such, P1 can be thought of as a special case of
P2, in which A = 1; we shall therefore concentrate on the more gen-
eral case of P2 in what follows.
First, consider the parties' respective payoffs. Given the man-
ager's underlying quality level, q, and level of benefit extraction, /3,
the aggregate value of the firm (or 7TF (q,fl)) consists of the expected
144 See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text (assessing how the introduction of
a potential acquirer affects the market for corporate control).
145 Id.
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value of the project less the fixed component of the wage paid to M:
rF (q,f= (1-l • Aq - w 
Exp.Val.of Project Fixed Wage
This value generally corresponds to the total capitalized stock value of
the company. Of this value, nonmanagerial shareholders enjoy a
(1 - a) share, while M receives the remaining a share. But in addi-
tion to her pro rata ownership share, M receives both her private
control benefits and her flat wage. Thus, the expected payoff of M is
as follows:
M(q, fl),.((1-fl).Aq-w)+ _fl ).Aq + w
Share ownership component Private Ben.Wage
Component
= (a.(-fl)+fl-4fl2 2).Aq +(1-) w
The manager sets 18 to maximize her expected payoff, which
yields an optimal level of value diversion of fl* = (1 - a). Note that
this optimal choice is independent of either the expected value of the
project chosen (Aq) or the manager's fixed wage (w). Substituting
this value into the parties' various payoffs, it is possible to derive Table
2 below. The columns of Table 2 correspond to the project chosen by
the manager (i.e., P1 or P2 ). The rows of the Table correspond to
different slices of the total payoff created from the selected project.
The first row reflects the manager's expected payoff (which includes
her private benefits, wages, and her pro rata earnings as a share-
holder). The second row reflects the expected payoff of nonmanage-
rial shareholders. The third row reflects the total capitalized value of
the company (that is, the sum of all the parties' share values). The
fourth row reflects the sum of the managerial and nonmanagerial ex-
pected payoffs, which we refer to as "aggregate" value.
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Expected payoff under P1 Expected payoff under P2
aq +(1-)w +-Aq+ (1-U)w
(1 - a)0 q - (1 - or)w (1- A q- (1- o)w
caq-w cAq-w
1-a+ 2j)q (a+I r'f JAq
In the discussion below, we use the term p0 as a shorthand for the
term O+ 2_. (For future reference, note that > !a and that>_I
PO -1 2 )
The optimal compensation package for M is one that attempts to
maximize the nonmanagerial shareholders' payoff subject to the con-
straints that (1) the manager must be paid enough to be willing to
work for the firm; and (2) the shareholders cannot directly control
which project the manager selects, but can only use the compensation
package to provide incentives to M .14
Analysis of this problem yields the conclusion that, in the absence of
a market for corporate control, the optimal contract pays M a wage of wN = 0,
and offers M incentive compensation of 0 7N = -L. Under this contract, the
manager sets 1 3 u = l, and chooses the project P1 if and only if A < 1.
A few details bear note about this result. First, even in this base-
line case, the optimal compensation package consists of a minimal
feasible wage level (which by our normalization implies WN = 0 ), 147
and then uses ownership shares in the company to provide incentives
for the manager to refrain from taking too many private benefits. In
particular, in this simple baseline case the optimal contract pays M
fully half of the firm's ownership shares in order to provide appropri-
ate deterrent incentives. This level of compensation may seem unreal-
istically high on first blush, and it would likely be smaller if we allowed
for other possible constraints on managerial behavior (such as proxy
contests) in a richer model. Adding such constraints, however, would
146 These constraints are often referred to, respectively, as "participation" and "in-
centive" constraints.
147 This will turn out to be true for the remainder of the discussion, and thus with-
out any loss of generality, we suppress the analysis of a flat wage and simply impose the
condition w=O.
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only introduce complexity without offering our fundamental conclu-
sions about shareholder choice. 4 s
Second, and perhaps most importantly, this baseline case reveals
that, in the absence of takeovers, shareholders can perfectly align the
manager's incentives with their own insofar as project choice is con-
cerned. Indeed, the manager always chooses the highest value project
from the shareholders' perspective and never selects project P2 when
it is inefficient (from the nonmanagerial shareholders' perspective) to
do so. Indeed, without any takeover market to worry about, the man-
ager evaluates P2 solely based on its ability to increase the firm's value
(to which she has a fractional claim).
C. Market for Corporate Control
Now consider M's incentives when faced with the possibility of a
takeover. As noted above, we assume that after M makes a project
choice, a single bidder (denoted by B) emerges as a potential ac-
quirer. Similar to M, B has some ability to run the firm, and thus
possesses her own quality parameter, 0, which we assume is similarly
distributed uniformly between 0 and 1 (but is statistically independent
of M's quality). Consequently, the bidder might be better than the
incumbent, but she is not necessarily so. The buyer must decide on
her bid without knowing the manager's quality-although the buyer
does know the distribution of q. She bids on control of the entire
firm based on her conjectures about incumbent managerial quality.
149
This Section analyzes and then compares two alternative rules
for regulating takeovers. Under the first rule (which we call "manage-
rial choice"), M has the right to veto a tender offer before other share-
holders are allowed to vote on it. This rule effectively requires that a
"4 Even small modifications to our framework could reduce this value.
For instance, if M 's private benefits were equal to (8- f8 2 ) the optimal
incentive scheme would pay M a share component of '- max{0,1-2 .}.
Thus, for small values of y, the manager receives very little incentive compensauon
because she is not sufficiently talented at diverting value. We resist adding additional
parameters like this to the model since they would add little more than additional no-
tational complexity. Moreover, as we shall see below, infra notes 148-56 and accompa-
nying text, the introduction of a market for corporate control will tend to reduce the
optimal share compensation below this level.
'49 Note that since M has chosen the project prior to the realization of q, the ob-
served project choice signals nothing to the bidder about the manager's quality. In
addition, we assume in what follows that a takeover by the bidder is tantamount to a
purchase of all the company's shares (rather than, say, a bare voting majority). Noth-
ing turns on this assumption.
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takeover offer be a friendly offer that compensates both the manager
and the shareholders for their respective reservation values. Such a
rule would correspond to permitting managers to 'Just say no." Un-
der the second rule (which we call "shareholder choice"), sharehold-
ers alone have the right to approve or disapprove a tender offer. This
rule, therefore, effectively allows either friendly or hostile bids
(though in our framework all such bids will appear hostile). In order
to give the shareholder choice rule a fair hearing, we shall assume (as
noted above) that the shareholders make an informed choice about
whether to sell, and thus learn about the incumbent manager's quality
before voting on a tender offer under either rule.
1. Managerial Choice Regime
First, consider the impact of the takeover market on firm value-
and in particular on the manager's choice between P1 and P2-
under a managerial choice regime. Under such a rule, both M and
the nonmanagerial shareholders must approve a tender offer in order
for B to succeed in acquiring the firm. Thus, the acquirer's bid must
attempt to compensate both the manager and the shareholders to
gain their joint approval. Consequently, under a managerial choice
rule, all tender offers must, by definition, be friendly ones. In this
case B will offer two prices when making her bid: one for the pur-
chase of all outstanding shares (denoted as Ps ) and the other func-
tioning as an additional "side payment" that goes to the incumbent
manager to obtain her approval (denoted as PM )'l0
For B 's tender offer to be successful, it must meet or exceed both
the incumbent shareholders' and M's expected payoffs under the
status quo. In particular, the manager will approve the acquisition if
she reaps gains from the deal at least as large as those she would have
received from continuing with the firm. Similarly, shareholders must
be as well off under the acquisition as they would be otherwise or they
will not approve the deal. Consequently, necessary and sufficient
conditions for a successful bid are such that:
* The total bid, (Ps + PM), must equal or exceed the total ag-
gregate value under the chosen project (i.e., the sum of the
shareholders' and M's combined expected payoffs), or
Z0 .A q from Table 2.
150 The amount paid to managers could take the form of a lucrative post-
acquisition employment contract. Note that by virtue of her share ownership, M also
stands to gain a or- fraction of the price paid to shareholders.
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* Of this total bid, the fraction directed to shareholders as a
group, ps/(ps+Pm), must be set equal to a/ji0 , which repre-
sents the ratio of firm value to aggregate value under the cho-
sen project.1
As previously noted, the total value of project P2 is qA if managed
by incumbent manager M. Should B acquire the firm, however, the
expected value of the project is OAc <_ OA (since, by assumption,
c _< 1 ). As above, we can limit our analysis to the case of P2, since
P1 is simply a special case of P2 where A = c = 1.
The bidder will set its bid, b, so as to maximize expected profits,
given by the probability that the bidder offers a bid sufficiently high to
induce the manager and shareholders to accept the bid, multiplied by
the expected returns to the bidder of the acquisition:
1 52
YB,(b;9)= minb ,. (OAc- b)
Analysis of this problem implies that the profit-maximizing bid 5 3
for the bidder is b* = "Ac In other words, the bidder will offer an2
amount equal to half the expected value of the firm under the bid-
der's management.
Now consider the probability that a takeover occurs when B fol-
lows this bidding strategy. The prospects of a takeover clearly depend
on the value q, the incumbent manager's quality. The greater the
incumbent's quality, the lower the likelihood that the bidder will
be able to increase the value of the firm beyond that of current
'5' To see this, note from Table 2 that the ratio of firm value to total social value is
precisely equal to . If price ratio offered by the bidder were not set at this level, the
bidder could induce a larger acceptance rate at no additional cost by setting the price
ratio accordingly.
152 To see this, note that:
ZB(b; 9) = Pr{b>/l0 .q .A}o (OAc-b)
= Pr{ q_---} b (OAc-b)
= min{- o ,l},(OAc-b)
'5 Explicitly, the first order conditions yield the following:




,U 0 A otherwise2#0o
But because fl0 >  c we know that 9 < 4 I < -, and thus the optimal bid is a]-
ways interior, and is that given above.
20031
644 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
management and, thus, the lower the likelihood that the bidder will
be able to make a successful bid. By contrast, the lower the quality of
the incumbent manager, the greater the probability that the bidder
will be able to find a bid that will induce the manager and sharehold-
ers to accept the deal. Mathematically, the probability of a takeover
given q is:
Pr{Takeover q}= max{(- "° q0}
A couple of points are worth brief mention at this juncture. .First,
as noted above, if q is sufficiently high, there is no chance that a take-
over will occur and, thus, the bidder's cost parameter, c, never is at
issue. For these situations, at least, it is clear that M 's incentives are
relatively better aligned with those of the shareholders. In particular,
these managers are effectively in a "no takeover" regime; such a high
quality manager would never select a project solely to ensure a lower
chance of a takeover. By contrast, a relatively low quality manager54
does face a risk of a tender offer, and thus, we must consider whether
such a manager might select project P2, even when it destroys value
to deter tender offers.155 As we shall see below, it turns out that M
will not select P2, against other shareholders' wishes, under a mana-
gerial choice regime because managerial choice ensures that a tender
offer can never make her worse off.
Given the likelihood of a takeover, we are now in a position to
characterize the total aggregate payoffs (of M and the shareholders)
that could be expected under a managerial choice rule. Given that
shareholders and the manager are each guaranteed to match their
status quo payoffs under a managerial choice rule, the expected total
payoffs to the shareholders and manager can be decomposed into the
status quo value of the firm, plus the expected premium arising from






154 That is, one for which q < c
1'5 Significantly, because the manager selects the project before she knows her
own quality, she must weigh the likelihood that she will be a high-quality manager
(and will not fear takeovers) against the chance that she will be low quality and will
want added protection against acquisitions.
156 This is derived by noting that the aggregate expected payoff is equal to
Eq [oqA+Eo [max {O, --- /oqA}]].
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Of this sum, recall that shareholders as a group receive a oo por-
tion of the total payoff, while M's private benefits constitute the re-
maining (1- ' ) portion. Dividing these up after accounting for the
manager's shareholdings in the firm, the manager's and nonmanage-
rial shareholders' expected payoffs under each respective project are:
Table 3






Analysis of this table leads to the conclusion that regardless of the
terms of the contract, M 's choice of project coincides precisely with that favored
by the shareholders. The optimal contract, (wV, ov ), sets wV = 0, and
V I
The intuition behind this result is straightforward, but important.
First, when tender offers are governed by a managerial choice regime,
managers always select the "right" project for the firm. Thus, allowing
managerial veto over tender offers ensures that M's incentives con-
cerning project choice are exactly aligned with those of the share-
holders, regardless of the manager's incentive compensation. Under
managerial choice, managers have no reason to destroy firm value in
order to deter acquisition because they have the authority to deter any
bidder who does not ensure that the manager receives at least her pri-
vate benefits of control. While this certainly may chill some takeover
bids (by making them more expensive), it removes the manager's in-
centive to choose P2 solely to chill takeover activity because the
managerial choice rule perfectly insures managers against such an
outcome. As we shall see below, this alignment of incentives does not
necessarily occur under a shareholder choice rule 57
157 Because it is technically tedious, we reserve discussion of the precise terms of an
optimal contract for this case until the numerical example discussed in a later Part.
+ a' + 0  1 + -- /Uo + )A
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The second part of the above result discusses the qualitative char-
acteristics of the optimal contract for the manager. As before, the op-
timal fixed wage for the manager is zero. The optimal share compen-
sation, or', on the other hand, is positive, but smaller than it would be
in the absence of a market for corporate control. The reason for this
is a bit less obvious, but also straightforward: unlike the case where no
takeover market exists, in this case shareholders know that at least
some probability exists that their payoff will come in the form of a
buyout rather than through M's management. Consequently, share-
holders would like to increase the share of any takeover premium that
they (as opposed to M) receive. By decreasing or, and thereby in-
creasing their own share of firm value, nonmanagerial shareholders
can claim a larger fraction of the buyout price when it occurs. On the
other hand, decreasing u causes M to behave more wastefully in situa-
tions where a takeover does not occur (by taking more private bene-
fits). Hence, shareholders decrease u to the point where the mar-
ginal benefit of claiming a larger share of the buyout surplus is offset
exactly by the marginal cost of weakening the manager's incentives.
2. Shareholder Choice Regime
We now consider an alternative legal regime in which the success
of tender offers hinges solely on shareholder approval, with no mana-
gerial veto rights. Under a shareholder choice regime, takeover bids
require only the approval of the nonmanagerial shareholders, who
hold a (1 - a) fraction of the firm.'5" Consequently, managers cannot
take any post-bid actions to affect the probability that the shareholders
See infra Part IV.E (discussing a shareholder choice rule). Nor is such a discussion nec-
essary here, since our result applies to all incentive compatible contracts and not just
the optimal one.
1 Note that our focus here is on non-managerial shareholders, and not all share-
holders. Of course, under both state acquisitions law (e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
251 (2001)) and federal securities law (e.g., Williams Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78n(d)
(1968)), tender offers are open to all shareholders (managerial or non-managerial).
Nevertheless, our focus on non-managerial shareholders is justified for a number of
reasons. First, we are interested in considering shareholder choice in those circum-
stances where the rule matters most: where non-managerial shareholders could ap-
prove a hostile transaction but for management's use of defenses. Second, even if
M held a majority of shares, this decision may have some elements of an interested
transaction and, thus, it would possibly require the vote of non-managerial sharehold-
ers to cleanse it. Finally, if M owned a majority of shares, she would be unlikely to
approve a tender offer that did not also give her side compensation for her own private
benefits and, thus, a shareholder choice regime would be no different from a manage-
rial veto regime.
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approve the deal. Under this regime, a successful buyer obviously still
needs to get shareholder approval, but does not need to obtain the
manager's consent. In effect, then, shareholder choice transforms all
takeovers into "hostile" ones, in that the buyer need not accord the
manager any special treatment in making a bid since M's imprimatur
is no longer required. Thus PM is equal to zero. (Recall, however,
that the manager may still benefit from a takeover to the extent that




As before, we shall consider how such a scenario would play out
for P2 (again noting the fact that P1 is a special case of P2 where
c = A = 1 ). Recall that the expected value of the firm's project is qA
if managed by M and OAc if by the bidder. Once private benefits are
accounted for, the total shareholder value of the company under
P2 is CqA. Accordingly, under a shareholder choice regime, B will
set its bid, b , to maximize expected profits:
B(b;O) = min{L,l}. (OAc-b).
Analysis of this problem yields the profit-maximizing bid for B of
b* =min{-A,0-A}.- 6° The probability of a takeover, in turn, depends on
the relative values of o and c. Following the analysis from the previous
Section, the probability that a takeover will occur is given by:
Pr{Takeover q}= max{(1- 2- q),O}.
Note that the probability of a takeover is increasing in c. Thus, as
intuition would suggest, the greater the negative impact of P2 on the
gains to a bidder, the lower the probability of a takeover. The prob-
ability of a takeover, however, does not depend at all on A. Indeed,
because this aspect, P2, is common to both the incumbent manager
and to B, it would be fully realized by both bidder and incumbent
symmetrically, thereby reducing both shareholders' minimum accept-
able bid price and the value of the firm to the bidder. Accordingly,
only the costs of P2 are reflected in the above expression through
.161
C .
See infra Part V (discussing intermediate regimes).
160 Or equivalently,
b* E if0<2 .
ot herwise*
Only if 0"<2 would B's optimal bid exhibit a kink at 6- 2 .
2C
161 While the bidder would certainly factor the benefits of P2 into her bid, the
shareholders of the firm would similarly do so when analyzing B's bid. Consequently,
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Comparing this probability to its counterpart in the managerial
choice section above immediately generates a few important conclu-
sions. First, the choice of P2 over P1 markedly decreases the probability of a
takeover under either shareholder choice or managerial choice. Thus, to the ex-
tent that shareholder choice increases managers' incentives to adopt P2, it re-
duces the probability of a bid occurring. Second, for any given compensation
package and product choice, whenever there exists a positive probability of a
takeover, it is larger under a shareholder choice regime than it is under a
managerial choice regime.
Equivalently, so long as we hold constant both manager's com-
pensation scheme and her initial project choice, a shareholder choice
regime increases the probability of a serious tender offer. The latter
argument constitutes a principal claim for most proponents of share-
holder choice. Our analysis confirms that, indeed, assuming there is
no effect on managerial decisions that M makes at the firm, share-
holder choice allows incumbent shareholders to claim the sole share
of the takeover premium, thereby facilitating the incidence of a take-
over bid.
Yet, the above analysis also reveals why shareholder choice need
not necessarily increase the probability of a serious tender offer: all
else is not always held constant. Explicitly, shareholder choice can re-
duce the probability of a tender offer in those circumstances where
the manager selects P2, but would have selected P1 under a manage-
rial choice rule because P 1 maximizes overall firm value. In this cir-
cumstance, shareholder choice potentially reduces both the probabil-
ity of a takeover and the takeover value of the company. Consequently,
in order to evaluate the impact of shareholder choice, we need to de-
termine whether managers would select P2, even if doing so would
not improve firm value (and, thus, they would not select P2 with a
managerial veto).
Consequently, consider now the expected value of the firm (or,
equivalently, the total share value) under the shareholder choice rule.
Suppressing some tedious algebra, the ex ante expected value of the
firm under shareholder choice is:
fAoq(1--) if cT<__
Firm Value= + 2 f >c
Aor~ 2 4aC I) 2
as A grows larger, the increased eagerness of B is exactly offset by the larger de-
mands of the firm's shareholders.
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Note from the above that firm value is increasing in both A and
c. This is intuitively sensible, since increases in A mean a higher over-
all project payoff, while increases in c mean a more viable market for
corporate control. Either of these is good news for the firm's share-
holders. Nonmanagerial shareholders, therefore, reap a (1 - a) frac-
tion of the above payoff. M, on the other hand, enjoys her pro-rata
payoff as a shareholder (i.e., a U - share of the sum calculated above),
plus her private benefits should no takeover occur. Once again
suppressing some algebra, the following tables represent the parties'
respective payoffs depending on project choice.









When the contract is such that or > ':
Table 5
Payoff under P1 Payoff under P2
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Comparing M's payoff with the nonmanagerial shareholders'
payoff in the above tables, one is immediately struck by the fact that,
unlike in the managerial choice case, the manager's and the nonman-
agerial shareholders' payoffs are no longer strictly proportional to one
another. Indeed, because a shareholder choice regime gives share-
holders a unique advantage over M when a takeover bid occurs, the
manager has less to lose by choosing P2 over P1 and may have some-
thing significant to gain: the preservation of her private benefits of
control. Consequently, M has a greater incentive to choose P2 in
situations where other shareholders would prefer P1.
This observation immediately leads to the conclusion that under a
shareholder choice rule, whenever a < 1 the manager will choose to pursue pro-
ject P2 in more circumstances than the shareholders would prefer; i.e., the
manager may select P2 even when doing so reduces value for nonmanagerial
shareholders.
This result is relatively simple to explain. Under a shareholder
choice regime, managers prospectively fear the loss of their private
benefits of control. Because such managers are not able to exercise a
veto right at the time of the tender offer, they use the one tool avail-
able to them for avoiding it-the choice of P2 over P 1. Even if P2
does not yield significant gains to the firm (or even imposes losses), it
is valuable to the manager in a shareholder choice regime because it
imposes costs on the firm's acquirers.
D. Incentive Pay Under Shareholder Choice
Recognizing the added agency cost imposed by a shareholder
choice regime, shareholders can choose to respond in one of two
ways. First, shareholders could simply live with the manager's wasteful
attraction to P2 and set M 's compensation assuming she will choose
that project. Alternatively, shareholders could attempt to increase
M's incentive compensation to induce her to select what they view as
the optimal project. Depending on the characteristics of P2, share-
holders might opt for either of these strategies. By inspection of the
above expressions, however, it is clear that the only way to fully align
M's incentives with that of the shareholders' for every possible combi-
nation of C and A is to set a = 1, effectively giving the entire firm to
the manager-a strategy they would clearly never choose. Regardless
of which strategy shareholders take, then, there are situations in which
a shareholder choice regime makes nonmanagerial shareholders
worse off than they would be under a managerial choice regime. This
reasoning leads to our last result that under a shareholder choice regime, so
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long as C is sufficiently small, there is a range of values for A within which
nonmanagerial shareholders would prefer the managerial choice rule over the
shareholder choice rule.
The above result formalizes our central argument in this Article.
Even if one assumes that shareholders are fully equipped and coordi-
nated to evaluate and act upon a tender offer, a shareholder choice
regime need not make shareholders better off (and may make them
worse off) after controlling for the up-front managerial decisions that
M makes. On the one hand, shareholder choice allows existing
shareholders to capture the entire takeover premium without being
forced to split it with incumbent management. A shareholder choice
rule can tempt M to select projects that specifically prevent takeover
bids from materializing, particularly when the value of c is relatively
small and the divide between managerial and shareholder incentives
is the greatest. To be sure, shareholders could attempt to stem this
added incentive problem by increasing M's share compensation (o).
But, so doing requires shareholders to surrender value to M regard-
less of whether a takeover ever occurs. Such a loss can easily eclipse
any speculative gain shareholders would enjoy in the more remote cir-
cumstance of a takeover bid.
Of course, the result stated above does not suggest that share-
holder choice is systematically worse than managerial choice. To the
contrary, either regime may be optimal, depending on the relative
values of c and A. This, however, is precisely our point: while some
firms may flourish ex ante under a shareholder choice regime, others
would be better off under a managerial choice rule. The likely variety
of circumstances that firms may face renders a blanket rule of share-
holder choice (or, for that matter, managerial choice) inappropriate.
E. Numerical Example
In order to clarify the formal results described above, it is useful to
illustrate them through a concrete example. Consider a specific case
of the framework just described in which VH = $1 million should M
choose the status quo project (P1). On the other hand, should
M select the pre-bid embedded defense ( P2), the value of the high
payoff for the firm is given by VH = A = $1.04 million; however, be-
cause of the defensive measure the firm loses all its value in the event
that it is acquired, and thus c = 0. Note that because P2 entails a
higher upside under incumbent management, but a lower downside
in the event of a takeover, it is not altogether obvious which of the two
projects would be preferred by shareholders. Nevertheless, it turns
2003]
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out that, in this case, nonmanagerial shareholders would always prefer
P1, a preference that is largely the artifact of the preclusive nature of
P2. 162 Indeed, in this example, the choice of P2 is particularly severe
because the manager is able to deter all takeovers (an admittedly ex-
treme case, but one that underscores our point).
The Table below presents the basic structure of the optimal con-
tract and the parties' behavior within each legal regime. Under a
managerial choice rule, M always picks the efficient project from the
nonmanagerial shareholders' perspective because she can deter hos-
tile offers without using P2.
Under shareholder choice, however, this need not be so, as dem-
onstrated above. In that case, the negative repercussions of choosing
P2 are so severe that the shareholders find it worthwhile to provide
M with an incentive to avoid the pre-bid embedded defense. So do-
ing, however, requires that M be paid a significant number of shares
as part of her compensation package. Indeed, under a shareholder
choice regime, M receives 65.7% of the firm in incentive pay, while
under managerial choice, she receives only 48.5%. While shareholder
choice gives the firm a larger capitalized value than managerial choice
($392,170 compared to $269,480), a significantly smaller fraction of
these rents actually go to the nonmanagerial shareholders. In fact,
the nonmanagerial shareholders have to compensate M so heavily in
a shareholder choice environment that they are left holding a smaller
undiluted amount ($134,270) than they would enjoy in a managerial
choice world ($138,720), where the manager would have a more
moderate incentive contract.
Table 6. Numerical Simulation
M's share Pref. Firm Non-Mgr. M's
(a) Project Val. SH Val. Payoff
Mgr. 48.5% P1 $269,480 $138,720 $343,060
Choice
SH 65.7% P1 $392,170 $134,270 $372,440
Choice
12 Explicitly, using the payoffs for non-managerial shareholders given in Tables 4-
5, it is possible to determine that non-managerial shareholders would favor PI regard-
less of M's wage so long as A is less than approximately $1.048 million.
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A few features of the table above are worth emphasizing. First,
note that the manager receives a relatively greater share of compensa-
tion under the shareholder choice rule. While a bit surprising, this
ordering is not merely coincidental. Indeed, within our framework,
the manager generally receives at least as much incentive pay in a
shareholder choice regime as she does in a managerial choice regime.
The intuition behind this ordering stems, in large part, from the fact
that under a shareholder choice regime, the firm must provide addi-
tional incentives for managers to eschew pre-bid embedded de-
fenses.
163
Second, as noted above, although shareholder choice induces a
higher capitalized value for the company in this example than does
managerial choice, using such values can be misleading. Explicitly, if
one constrains attention to undiluted share value enjoyed by nonman-
agerial shareholders, shareholder choice makes them worse off than
the status quo. This observation provides a cautionary note for those
who would assess the efficiency of any legal regime based on share
value alone. In this case, the increase in firm value under shareholder
choice is largely diverted to the manager, leaving nonmanagerial
stakeholders worse off.1
64
To be sure, the example explored above is a particularly stark one,
chosen to highlight our arguments. Nevertheless, this Section dem-
onstrates the reasonable possibility that shareholder choice proposals
often have unintended effects when one considers distortions to ex
ante behavior.
163 Even when non-managerial shareholders are not willing to provide M with in-
centives to avoid P2, they will still tend to compensate M with relatively greater share
ownership. Indeed, since the adoption of P2 makes a takeover less likely, it thereby
makes it more important that the compensation package itself minimize the costs asso-
ciated with private benefits of control.
164 Although managers' power to adopt embedded defenses obviously hurts non-
managerial shareholders, a defender might still argue that shareholder choice remains
desirable since it maximizes the sum of all parties' expected payoffs (at least in this ex-
ample). Yet while shareholder choice maximizes joint welfare in this example, it does
not do so in all cases. More significantly, it is not clear that managerial rents should be
accorded the same "welfare weight" as shareholder returns, particularly if the object of
the manager's contract is to serve shareholder interests. Finally, the very debate over
shareholder choice has centered on the claim that the interests of non-managerial share-
holders themselves are served by allocating them greater discretion over takeovers. Our
analysis demonstrates why this claim may frequently fail.
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V. INTERMEDIATE REGIMES
The previous two Sections demonstrated that, under plausible cir-
cumstances, shareholder choice may be inferior to managerial choice.
To illustrate this claim, our analysis drew on a particularly strong form
of shareholder choice, in which shareholders hold the ultimate au-
thority to accept or reject any takeover bid, as well as any post-bid or
targeted defense. This Section briefly considers the possibility that
some intermediate or hybrid regime might be preferable to either of
these extremes, focusing on three types of intermediate regimes.
A. Categorical Regulation of Defenses
Some commentators have proposed ontological shareholder
choice regimes that turn on how managers deter hostile offers. Un-
der such regimes, courts could invalidate only certain identified de-
fensive measures, leaving managers free to use others that may appear
to be less harmful to nonmanagerial shareholders. While such ap-
proaches may hold some promise, their effectiveness hinges on the
ease with which managers can substitute between substantially equiva-
lent defenses. When such substitution is possible, this form of share-
holder choice does little to reduce either managers' control over ten-
der offers or their ability to appropriate private benefits.
Consider, for example, a rule under which courts invalidate pure
defenses and those that managers undertake after a bid has been
made.165 Under this rule, managers would not adopt blanket defenses,
but only because they could instead employ targeted pre-bid embed-
ded defenses. Thus, such a rule would do little to facilitate hostile ac-
quisitions since managers could retain their power over hostile acqui-
sitions by shifting to the use of targeted pre-bid embedded defenses as
entrenchment devices.
Alternatively, courts could adopt a rule granting shareholders au-
thority to overrule any pure or targeted defense post-bid, regardless of
165 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel propose a rule requiring managerial passiv-
ity in the face of a tender offer. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 40, at 1203 (suggest-
ing that actions taken after an offer should be presumed invalid by courts as having
been made in order to defeat the offer). To the extent that this rule only regulates
post-bid defenses, it would have little effect on managerial control over tender offers as
managers could simply adopt pure defenses pre-bid. Interpreting their passivity to in-
validate managers' use of pre-bid pure defenses to retain control over takeovers we
eliminate this problem, but would not eliminate managerial control over takeovers for
the reasons given above. See also supra Part II.B (discussing targeted pre-bid embedded
defenses).
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when it is adopted. To the extent shareholders credibly use this
power to overrule defenses for any tender offer that maximizes share-
holder value, this regime would effectively replicate the shareholder
choice rule studied above, providing managers with an incentive to
implement pre-bid blanket embedded defenses. We are therefore
rather pessimistic that such a hybrid regime would prove any more ef-
fective than the regime studied above. Moreover, ex post shareholder
authority over targeted pre-bid embedded defenses would undermine
companies' ability to use such measures when they are value enhanc-
ing.1
66
Similar problems would plague a rule requiring ex ante share-
holder approval of those pre-bid embedded defenses most directly
targeted at hostile acquisitions. Should shareholders use this author-
ity to invalidate the most targeted pre-bid defenses, managers could
simply employ substitute untargeted defenses, which impose even
greater costs on the firm.167 Moreover, it is more likely that sharehold-
ers would be unable to use this authority to regulate targeted pre-bid
embedded defenses through ex ante voting because, when voting on
ordinary business transactions, shareholders do not have sufficient
incentives to obtain the information necessary to exercise their
franchise effectively. Indeed, shareholders' current willingness to ap-
prove "shark repellent" defenses-such as fair price amendments and
dual class stock-suggest that regulating such defenses through pre-
bid shareholder approval may not be particularly effective.'68
Finally, courts could target blanket pre-bid embedded defenses by
prohibiting (or requiring ex ante shareholder approval for) all day-to-
day business transactions that impose sufficient costs on potential ac-
quirers to deter bids, regardless of their ex ante effect on firm value.
In terms of the previous Section's model, this would mean allowing
courts (and/or shareholders) to invalidate any defensive measure for
which the value of c is sufficiently low. Prudently executed, such a
' See supra note 60 (discussing the European Union's proposed break through
rule).
"' See Black & Kraakman, supra note 38, at 561 (arguing that Delaware should re-
quire ex ante approval for a greater range of transactions that could be employed as
takeover defenses).
"" See Gilson, supra note 22, at 822-27 (discussing the problems with pre-bid
shareholder decision making that result in shareholders approving "shark repellant"
antitakeover amendments that reduce shareholder value); Supa Part II.B.1 (discussing
courts' problems regulating targeted defenses requiring shareholder approval); see also
supra Part I.D. 1 (discussing the unregulability of pre-bid embedded defenses).
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regime might be able to stem some of the moral hazard problems that
we identify above. Yet, there are two problems with such a regime.
First, as discussed above, neither courts nor shareholders can ef-
fectively regulate ordinary business decisions. Thus, it is far from clear
that either courts or shareholders can assess the costs of an embedded
measure (in the form of c) any better than they can assess the firm-
specific benefits of an embedded defense (in the form of A). Indeed,
both assessments require one to consider abstract, prospective effects
of a particular business plan. This calculus would be particularly diffi-
cult-and the negative effects on contracting parties especially great-
if managers respond to oversight by including defenses in a variety of
contracts that impose small costs individually, but large costs in the
aggregate. 169
Second, even if shareholders or courts could prohibit all high cost
(low c) measures, it is far from clear that it would be optimal for them
to do so. Embedded measures that impose high costs on acquisitions
do not necessarily reduce shareholder welfare. A measure that im-
poses high costs on acquisitions may also provide the firm with high
ex ante benefits, in the form of a superior contract with a third party
who is particularly vulnerable to a change of control.1 70 Moreover, the
ostensibly costly measure may impose little ex ante cost on sharehold-
ers in those circumstances where the ex ante probability of an acquisi-
tion occurring absent the measure is already quite low. Accordingly, it
is difficult to determine whether regulating such "high cost" arrange-
ments would be efficient without having a much better sense of the
effect of such measures on ex ante firm value. Without knowledge
1 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing problems with ex ante shareholder regulation
of penalty change of control provisions) & note 119 (discussing why shareholders ap-
prove value-reducing shark repellents). Regulating such contracts would be particu-
larly likely to decrease firm value because third parties could not tell, by looking at
their own contracts, the likelihood that the court would invalidate the potentially de-
fensive term.
170 Indeed, there are plausible reasons why blanket embedded measures that im-
pose high costs on the firm ex post also could provide high benefits ex ante. As previ-
ously discussed, many firms employ blanket embedded measures for legitimate (non-
defensive) purposes. High penalties often are imposed on the target in such transac-
tions in order to compensate those third parties who are particularly vulnerable to in-
jury in the event of a change of control. Thus, the welfare of many firms might be
lower under a rule that prohibits clauses that grant third parties substantial compensa-
tion in the event of a change of control. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the legitimate
uses of penalty change of control provisions); see also text accompanying notes 97-100
(discussing the Donna Karan change of control provision).
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about the likely benefits from pre-bid embedded defenses, courts
would have little hope of formulating and executing a prudent policy.
B. Strategic Uncertainty Regarding Managerial Authority
Perhaps ironically, one promising hybrid of shareholder choice
may come in a retreat from the doctrinal certainty that many choice
proponents (and legal scholars more generally) usually favor. It may
be possible both to reduce agency costs and to deter managers from
substituting untargeted embedded defenses through a regime in
which courts invalidate some, but not all, managerial defenses, delib-
erately obscuring the types of defenses that are challengeable."
While legal ambiguity may seem unwise at first blush, it may give
courts a way to award shareholders a partial ability to combat manage-
rial resistance. Managers who are uncertain whether a specific tar-
geted defense will ultimately be upheld may continue to favor tar-
geted defenses over untargeted ones, in order to obtain the potential
benefit of a friendly deal. Yet, recognition that their targeted defenses
may not be upheld may both reduce their appetite for private benefits
(as these also tend to induce bids), while also making them more will-
ing to negotiate with would-be acquirers. 1
For instance, consider a version of the example from the previous
Section, in which there is some uncertainty about whether the ulti-
mate rule will favor managerial choice or shareholder choice. Sup-
pose that there is a 75% chance that a court will allow managers to
veto a bid and a 25% chance that shareholders will ultimately be al-
lowed to accept a bid. In this example, the manager is less tempted
(relative to shareholder choice) to select an inefficient untargeted de-
fense (P2) because she is still relatively likely to be given freedom to
select among bidders. Consequently, shareholders do not need to
grant increased incentive compensation in order to deter the use of
value-reducing blanket defenses: indeed, the optimal contract in this
example would award the manager a 43.6% share of the firm (down
from 48.5% under a managerial veto and 65.7% under a shareholder
choice regime). More importantly, nonmanagerial shareholders
1 For a discussion of other reasons why Delaware courts may favor vague laws see
Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998).
172 For another analysis of how legal uncertainty can augment allocational effi-
ciency through bargaining, see Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a
Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
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would expect a payoff of $147,290 under this intermediate regime, up
considerably from $138,720 under the managerial choice rule and
$134,270 under shareholder choice. 173 On the whole, then, in this ex-
ample this type of intermediate regime would increase shareholders'
value above either of the two extreme cases. Our analysis therefore
suggests that at least some types of intermediates (such as that repre-




Before concluding, it is useful to situate our argument within the
growing empirical literature on corporate governance. So doing al-
lows us to gauge the "fit" of our claims as a practical matter. Many of
the points we have made above have some support in the available
empirical data, and may even offer alternative explanations for phe-
nomena that legal and finance scholars have found curious.
A. Shareholder Attitudes Toward Managerial Choice
Although it is not possible to test our claims directly, empirical
analysis of shareholders' attitudes towards governance devices pro-
vides indirect evidence on whether shareholders expect to benefit
from broad adoption of shareholder choice. If strong-form share-
holder choice proponents were obviously correct in their claims, one
would expect shareholders of many, if not most, firms to support such
proposals. Their support would be manifest on numerous dimen-
sions, including: (1) widespread resistance to tender offer defenses in
IPO charters; (2) support for charter provisions restricting a board's
ability to adopt the poison pill (or requiring boards to redeem the pill
if shareholders support a bidder); and (3) support for shareholder
'7' Managers, on the other hand, would fare worse under this regime, expecting a
payoff of $312,160 (down from $343,060 and $372,440, respectively).
17' Thus, empirical evidence that certain antitakeover statutes may lower firm value
relative to that under Delaware law is not inconsistent with our analysis. See Daines,
supra note 136, at 546-47 (finding that firms incorporated in states with stronger anti-
takeover statutes than Delaware have lower value than those incorporated in Dela-
ware). We argue that a strong shareholder choice may reduce firm value relative to
firm value under either Delaware's managerial veto rule or particular intermediate re-
gimes. Yet our results do not suggest that a stronger managerial choice regime than
Delaware's would enhance firm value. To the contrary, the analysis above suggests that
weakening Delaware's regime by making managerial authority less certain could in-
crease firm value.
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proposals seeking to declassify boards of existing firms. Moreover,
one would expect the percentage of firms that limit board power over
tender offers to have increased over time with the rise of institutional
investors.
Yet, in contrast to the claims of shareholder choice proponents-
but consistent with our analysis-investors have displayed a tepid re-
sponse to each of these shareholder choice proposals at the individual
firm level. Indeed, not only does the existing evidence fail to demon-
strate a consistent, growing pressure for shareholder choice, much of
it shows exactly the opposite.
For example, a study of over 300 IPOs between 1994 and 1997
found that a majority of IPO firms explicitly included antitakeover
provisions in their charters. 7 5 Indeed, over sixty percent of the IPO
firms had charters that specifically strengthened the poison pill by
either establishing a staggered board or by making it difficult for
shareholders to replace the board between annual meetings.176 No
firm included a provision to either limit board authority to adopt anti-
takeover provisions in the future or to prohibit or limit the use of poi-
son pills.
177
Moreover, the proportion of firms going public with staggered
boards appears to have increased over time. A later study found that
the percentage of firms going public with staggered boards increased
from thirty-four percent in the early 1990s to eighty-two percent in
1999.178 This increased use of a staggered board occurred over the
very period in which shareholders came to understand the tremen-
dous power of a staggered board as a defensive mechanism. 7 9 This
data on IPOs is consistent with our analysis.
175 Daines & Klausner, supra note 25, at 85 ("[R]oughly two-thirds of the firms in
our sample have [antitakeover provisions] that can pose a significant impediment to a
hostile acquisition, and about half have adopted the strongest [provisions]."); see also
Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN.
1857, 1858 (2002) (finding that fifty-three percent of industrial firms going public
from 1988 to 1992 employed at least one antitakeover defense).
176 Kahan & Rock, supra note 29, at 885 (reporting results obtained from Robert
Daines' and Michael Klausner's data on antitakeover provisions).
77 Daines & Klausner, supra note 25, at 95. These results are consistent with those
obtained by Coates, supra note 116, at 1353, 1375-77.
178 Coates, supra note 116, at 1376.
179 See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 29, at 911 (reporting on increase in share-
holder opposition to staggered boards); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease
Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 853
(2002) (citing studies showing that, during the late 1990s, between forty-four percent
and eighty-two percent of IPO charters included staggered board provisions); see also
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Another piece of evidence comes from examining how (and
whether) shareholders actively campaign for shareholder choice.
Notwithstanding the rise of institutional investors, shareholders of ex-
isting publicly held firms have not campaigned vigorously either to
limit control over tender offer defenses or to restrict boards' use of
the poison pill. Despite early interest in precatory shareholder resolu-
tions seeking to control boards' use of the pill, since 1996 the number
of such resolutions has declined to an average of less than ten to fif-
teen per year. Moreover, these resolutions generally fail (although
they have garnered more shareholder votes than previously).'s° Insti-
tutional shareholders-including state pension funds-also have not
used their considerable political power to advocate for legislative
adoption of shareholder choice regimes.
There are many competing explanations for this lack of share-
holder interest in more direct shareholder governance. One possibil-
ity is that the conventional arguments favoring managerial choice are
right: post-bid, shareholders benefit from managerial control over the
bidding process."" Another possible explanation may be found in de-
ficiencies and/or inertia in the IPO market and in the bidding proc-
ess itself.
1 2
Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 6, at 925 (showing the increased likeli-
hood that a company with a staggered board will remain independent when faced with
a hostile bid for acquisition).
1 Kahan & Rock, supra note 29, at 885-86. Shareholders of existing firms have
started to attempt to limit the use of one defense-staggered boards-by resisting
charter amendments to establish staggered boards and voting in increasing numbers
for shareholder resolutions seeking to declassify existing classified boards. Id. at 886-
87. This, however, is far from a general move to establish shareholder choice. Share-
holders have not similarly moved to restrict boards' ability to adopt poison pills.
Moreover, these anti-staggered board efforts have not been part of a general move-
ment, but have been targeted at particular firms. Id. at 886 n.76. Moreover, they have
either failed or have prevailed only in a precatory form. Id. at 887 nn.77-78.
8 E.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 29, at 897-99 (concluding that shareholders may
find more value in "complex takeover regime[s]" than in increasing their own con-
trol).
182 Recently, Lucian Bebchuk has offered alternative potential explanations for
shareholders' apparent disinterest in voluntarily adopting shareholder choice. Relying
on efficiency-based, agency-based, and information-based explanations, he shows that
when managers have private information about firm value and when private benefits to
managers are positively correlated with firm value, then firms going public might not
offer a charter provision restricting defenses even though such a provision would be
optimal. Bebchuk, supra note 81, at 730-43. This result turns on the firms being un-
able to signal firm value through mechanisms other than the charter provision of
takeovers, and on the assumption that private benefits are positively correlated with
firm value.
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Our analysis presents an additional explanation, however: share-
holders recognize that shareholder choice could reduce their welfare
by inducing managers to implement value-reducing blanket defenses,
thereby forcing shareholders to suffer the cost of either decreased ac-
quisitions or substantially increased managerial incentive pay. Thus,
our analysis suggests that shareholders may accept poison pills and
classified boards because they recognize that they cannot, in fact, pre-
clude the use of defensive measures. Consequently, they would prefer
to accept the relatively modest costs associated with these targeted
measures in order to avoid the greater evil of the alternative blanket
defenses managers might otherwise employ.
Viewed in this light, shareholders' apparent disinterest in cam-
paigning aggressively for shareholder choice may not be a product of
collective action problems, lack of information, or failures of the IPO
markets. Rather, it may simply represent an informed choice given an
accurate assessment of the options available to them and the limited
potential domain of shareholder choice. As the defenses shareholders
can regulate are, ultimately, less destructive of firm value than other
blanket defenses managers might employ, shareholders may live with
these defenses (including "just say no") for fear that the alternative
would be worse.
B. Evidence on Defenses and Executive Compensation
Additional evidence exists to support our claim. If managers can
implement substitute value-reducing defenses, our analysis reveals that
greater shareholder control over tender offers could potentially lead
to one of two phenomena: (1) managers would routinely adopt these
defenses, or (2) shareholders would deter them from doing so by in-
creasing managers' ownership share in the firm. In any event, our
model predicts that managers' share of ownership should be higher
on average under shareholder choice regimes, in part to deter them
from employing untargeted defenses.
The conclusion that managers' share of ownership should be
higher when there are few antitakeover devices is contrary to a more
classic agency cost view. Under this view, firms are more likely to
utilize incentive compensation when managers are insulated by anti-
takeover devices from the market for corporate control, on the theory
that firms employ incentive compensation to mute agency costs
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heightened by the lack of an active market for corporate control."" By
contrast, our theory predicts that firms are less likely to employ incen-
tive pay when managers are insulated by pure defenses from hostile
acquisitions because these defenses help align managers' incentives
with those of shareholders as to the value of friendly deals.
Empirical analysis of the relationship between antitakeover de-
vices and incentive compensation suggests that, consistent with our
analysis, the lower the managers' ability to use traditional antitakeover
defenses, the higher their incentive pay. Consider, for example, the
following correlation matrix, drawn from a data set pairing executive
compensation data with corporate governance data of 1,200 publicly
traded firms in the year 2000. The variable in the first row and col-
umn is (1) the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the firm's
highest paid executive (usually the CEO) and represents a measure of
incentive pay. The remaining variables designate the existence of (2)
blank check preferred stock; (3) classified boards; (4) a poison pill
provision in the firm's bylaws; (5) the cross product of classified
boards and poison pills; and (6) the existence of change of control
provisions in executive stock options. Variables (2) through (6) are
all measures of how resistant a corporation is to hostile bids.
183 E.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 29, at 898 (suggesting that firms responded to
the rise of takeover defenses by implementing adaptive defenses, such as executive
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Table 7. Executive Share Ownership vs. Corporate
Governance In ciPlal






-0.2978 0.1394 0.2535 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.1985 0.1467 0.6701 0.7153 100
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0000
-0.2599 0.0572 0.1801 0.2994 0.2493 1.0000
0.0000 0.0474 0.0000 0.0000 .0000
Note that every antitakeover provision in Table 7 is positively cor-
related with every other one at least at a ninety-five percent confi-
dence level, suggesting that such provisions are often complements
rather than substitutes for one another. What is more striking, how-
ever, is the negative correlation that each of these variables has with
executive share ownership. Indeed, every single antitakeover protec-
tion is negatively correlated with share percentage and, all but one
(classified boards), are statistically significant.15 Moreover, the eco-
nomic magnitudes of many of these correlations appear to be moder-
ately high. From an aggregate perspective, then, managerial incentive
compensation appears to grow when managers' ability to employ tar-
geted defenses shrinks.1
6
is1 IRRC database, supra note 74 (compiling governance data for 2000); Standard
& Poor's, Compustat, at http://www.compustat.com/www (n.d.) (compiling executive
compensation data for 2000 from database). Correlations were done on a pair-wise
basis with P-values in italics.
"s Our data codes for classified boards of all types, as opposed to the "effective
classified boards" examined in Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 6 (defin-
ing "effective" classified boards as those where the board is classified in the certificate
and the certificate limits the number of directors and restricts shareholders' ability to
act through written consent).
186 A simple correlational analysis, of course, leaves open the question of which
way causation is likely to run. While the results above are consistent with our analysis,
it is also the case that managers who own a lot of shares have less need to seek tender
offer defenses. We plan to examine this relationship in more detail in future scholar-
ship.
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Also consistent with our conclusion, another recent study found
that incentive pay is both positively related to the presence of




Both of these tendencies seem to cut against the conventional, opera-
tional agency cost story, and toward our "tender offer defenses"
agency cost story. The relationship between incentive pay and inde-
pendent directors is consistent with our analysis to the extent that in-
dependent directors make it more difficult for managers to deter
value-enhancing hostile acquisitions and appropriate private benefits
from friendly acquisitions. In this case, managers of firms with inde-
pendent directors may be more inclined to employ embedded de-
fenses if concerned they cannot later employ targeted defenses to de-
ter hostile deals.' s Increasing their incentive pay may deter this form
of agency cost. Although this is but a sampling of how our framework
might be tested empirically, it nonetheless suggests that the analytical
arguments presented above may help explain behavior in publicly
traded companies.
CONCLUSION
Delaware's embrace of a 'just say no" defense grants managers
considerable ability to insulate themselves from the disciplining effect
of the market for corporate control. This almost certainly results in
managers misappropriating far greater private benefits-and provid-
ing shareholders less value-than they would if subject to a well-
functioning takeover market.
Proponents of shareholder choice argue that the solution to this
problem is for the courts to insist that shareholders exercise ultimate
authority over whether an acquisition should proceed. 8 9 Suchjudicial
insistence would permit shareholders to voice their preferences about
the very hostile acquisitions most likely to increase shareholder wel-
fare and discipline management.
In this Article, we have demonstrated that while such arguments
for shareholder choice have considerable merit, they are not enough
to win the day. Conventional justifications of shareholder choice
,8 Harvey & Shrieves, supra note 27, at 511.
8 Indeed, it seems likely that independent directors are comparatively inept at
deterring embedded, pre-bid defenses, since they frequently have little direct familiar-
ity with the operational decisions of the company (within which such defenses are hid-
den).
89 See supra Part I.B (discussing shareholder choice proposals).
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generally presume that managers will not change their behavior in the
19
face of a reduction in their historical discretion."" There is no reason
to expect this to be the case. Indeed, the history of acquisitions and
tender offer defenses is literally littered with examples in which man-
agers creatively invent new defenses to meet new threats to their con-
trol.
A complete analysis of shareholder choice, therefore, requires
that we recognize that managers will act in their own self interests and
seek ways to deter either hostile bids in particular, or friendly and hos-
tile bids generally. Specifically, managers faced with a shareholder
choice regime will likely turn to embedded defenses adopted long be-
fore a tender offer, as these are the defenses courts would be least
able to regulate without doing injury to the foundational premise that
publicly held firms should be managed by professional managers, not
shareholders (or courts).
In examining existing business practices, this Article has revealed
a host of ostensibly legitimate arrangements that can simultaneously
deter takeovers. Such arrangements include blank check preferred
stock, management contracts, and change of control provisions in
third-party contracts. Moreover, these arrangements are sufficiently
varied and flexible that one must assume that managers-if suffi-
ciently motivated by a fear of hostile takeovers-could devise a variety
of other pre-bid arrangements which could operate as a serious im-
pediment to bids.
Examining the risk that managers would adopt such measures in
response to shareholder choice, this Article shows that shareholder
choice would make managers willing to employ value-reducing blan-
ket embedded defenses that they would not adopt under a managerial
choice rule. Managers subject to shareholder choice would have
much to gain from such defenses as they would help block hostile
deals. They also would have less to lose because shareholder choice
would squeeze out the friendly deals managers would otherwise seek
to protect. Accordingly, in order to retain their private benefits, man-
agers subject to shareholder choice would be more likely to adopt
blanket defenses that deter all acquisitions, or at least credibly
threaten to do so. In either case, shareholder choice can reduce the
expected payoff of nonmanagerial shareholders.
Consequently, shareholders' apparent disinterest in campaigning
aggressively for shareholder choice may not be a product of collective
190 Id.
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action problems, lack of information, or failures of the IPO markets.
Rather, shareholders may fail to insist on shareholder choice because
they recognize that it is not practically available to them under a re-
gime of professional managerial control of day-to-day business
decisions. Under this regime, shareholders could block certain de-
fenses, but not all defenses. Because the defenses shareholders can
block-such as the poison pill-are, in the end, less destructive of
firm value than other blanket defenses managers might employ,
shareholders may live with the pill (and 'Just say no") for fear that the
alternative would be worse.
This is not to say that shareholder choice is invariably inferior to
managerial choice. But the case for shareholder choice must depend
on more than a partial equilibrium claim that shareholders may be
better able to evaluate tender offers than managers. Rather, the case
for shareholder choice must depend on a full comparison of the two
regimes as they would actually be implemented. In particular, we
must consider shareholder choice recognizing that courts cannot
regulate all defenses, and that managers will adapt and seek out de-
fenses in these zones beyond court regulation. Only if shareholder
choice is superior under such circumstances should we ultimately be
willing to embrace it.
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